



**CHALLENGE
HATE CRIME**

DEAL WITH IT

REPORT 09

ANTI HATE CRIME AND DERADICALISATION INTERVENTIONS

RESULTS OF RECENT GOOD PRACTICE STUDIES

**Anti Hate Crime and Deradicalisation
Interventions – in prison and community
The results of recent good practice studies in
Germany and internationally**

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Violence Prevention Network (VPN) consists of a group of experienced specialists with many years of successful practice in extremism prevention, deradicalisation and reduce-hate-crime work. Various federal ministries, state-level justice departments and institutional partners have worked with VPN from its inception in 2001. They value the “Taking Responsibility – Breaking away from Hate and Violence” programme that VPN has developed and implemented in prisons and in community work. VPN’s main target groups are young people from different backgrounds who have committed hate crimes motivated by bias, inclined either towards right-wing extremist ideology or forms of radical Islam.

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Contents

A.	Two studies in Germany: ‘Towards Preventing Violent Radicalisation’ (TPVR, 2011) and: ‘Media Interaction ... and Preventing Adolescent Violence and Extremism’ (LIPAV, 2011).	1
A.1	Discussion of some general impact factors of good-practice exit hate crime work according to TPVR and LIPAV	1
	Non-governmental facilitators from outside	
	Institutional support	
	Working in the group and with the group	
	The facilitators’ professional persona	
	Narrative mode of interaction	
	Relationship-based narrative interaction	
	The attitude of critical attentiveness	
	The factor of culture/ media	
	Risk and pitfalls of behaviourist traditions	
A.2	Observational criteria for success in anti hate crime work	8
A.3	Summing up: impact factors and practice-guidelines for hate crime and deradicalisation interventions according to TPVR and LIPAV	8
<hr/>		
B.	The recent evaluation of the Federal Government’s Model-Project Programme in Germany (‘Diversity’ / ‘Vielfalt’ on approaches with young people that are drawn towards right-wing extremism	10
	Direct “conflict management” and the factors of “lifeworld” and “socio-emotional development”	10
	The need to work with the hard to engage (young) offenders	10
	Working with personal conflict and psychological dynamics	10
	Reluctance to deal with difficult to engage offenders	11
	Cognitive versus emotional learning – don’t “overstress educational topics”, instead emphasise “subject-focus, emotional processes and identity issues” during the intervention	11
	The power of prejudices comes from emotion – not cognition	11
	“Cognitive level of ideologies” generally not crucial – what counts is “people’s lifeworld and psycho-affective experiences”	12
	Strengthen professional attitudes and quality management	13
	Party-political discourses from left to right: debates on “long-term/ short-term” interventions and “quick fixes”	13
	“Misconceived short-term orientation ... (can have) disastrous consequences”	14

	The pitfalls of behaviourist 'anti-aggression training' 15	15
	– the "hot seat" method	
	The pitfalls of de-contextualised family constellations (Bert Hellinger) ... 15	15
	How political discourses may lead to counterproductive 16	16
	reassignments of funds: the German government's current political agenda – in contrast with European strategies for the prevention of extremism and hate crime	
	The EU Stockholm Programme – evidence-based, promising 18	18
	strategies for Europe	
	The importance of community organisations, 18	18
	NGOs and non-profit "social entrepreneurs"	
	Comment on the situation in the UK – the TPVR results 19	19
<hr/>		
C.	The international conference "Tackling Extremism: 20	20
	Deradicalisation and Disengagement", Copenhagen 2012.	
<hr/>		
D.	The German Federal Criminal Police Office's (BKA) research project 23	23
	on violent extremists and terrorists from different countries and different ideological backgrounds (Saskia Lützing)	
	D.1 Commonalities in biography and psycho-social 23	23
	patterns of extremists/ terrorists from different milieus	
	D.2 Key results of the Lützing-study – context 27	27
	and push factors of violent radicalization	
<hr/>		
E.	'Jacky' – case study of a young neo-Nazi woman in Germany. 29	29
	Michaela Köttig's biographical research on the life-history, ideology, and psychological make-up of violent right-wing extremists in Germany	
<hr/>		
F.	Two OSCE guides: addressing issues of educational methods 37	37
	countering contemporary anti-Semitism as well as intolerance and discrimination against Muslims.	
	F.1 Educational methods countering contemporary anti-Semitism 37	37
	Establish a constructive environment	
	Be patient	
	Be clear and consistent in your reactions	
	Avoid preaching	
	Remember that individuals make a difference	
	Be realistic	
	Encourage self-reflection	
	Use life experiences	
	Develop critical thinking	
	Try to avoid victimization	

Focus on the diversity of what it means to be Jewish
 Connect the school with the wider community
 Call in help when necessary
 Conclusion

F.2	Guidelines for educators on countering intolerance and discrimination against Muslims	40
<hr/>		
G.	Overall Conclusion: general guidelines of good-practice in anti hate crime and deradicalisation interventions and their contextual prerequisites	44
G.1	The good practice intervention itself – and its components.....	44
G.2	The context factors of good-practice intervention programmes	49
G.3	Summary of general principles of good-practice anti hate crime and deradicalisation interventions	52

**Note: italicizations of words and phrases
in the text are those of the author**

A Two studies in Germany: 'Towards Preventing Violent Radicalisation' (TPVR, 2011) and: 'Media Interaction ... and Preventing Adolescent Violence and Extremism' (LIPAV, 2011)¹

The TPVR and LIPAV Good Practice research project aimed at analyzing exemplary social-therapeutic approaches of group work with hate crime offenders from right-wing and Muslim fundamentalist backgrounds in Germany. Using a qualitative-empirical design of open, non-thematic methods, as biographical-narrative and focussed-narrative interviews with participants and facilitators, group discussions and participative observation, the study (a) elaborates criteria according to which good practice in the field of deradicalisation and re-integration may be recognised, and (b) analyses the crucial impact factors of the analyzed intervention method. It also puts them into perspective with recent research on violence, terrorism and hate crime (see Lützing, Section D) – in particular the 2010 study of the Federal Criminal Justice Agency and other recent qualitative studies. Further, reference is made to the evaluation of Federal Model Projects from the current 'Federal Programme' of anti-extremism work in Germany (see Diversity 2010, Section B).

The best practice approaches of the study apply a systematic form of open-process group-training, which is offset by one-to-one talks, also using biography work, group-dynamic work, civic education/ political discussion, some elements of family counselling, and provides post-release coaching. The method builds on the participants' willingness to speak to a group about oneself, about one's life prior to prison, about families and friends, one's political orientations, as well as the acts of violence one has committed – which is different from classical approaches such as anti-aggression training or fully modularised cognitive behavioural programmes. Pedagogical exercises, confidence-building, role-playing, drawing a biography curve may assist the process. The 'violent act sessions' which aim at precisely reconstructing the actions, thoughts, fantasies and feelings of each offender during one of his hate crime scenes, form a central element of the work. The recidivism rate, which is generally estimated to be around 80% with this offender type, is reduced to under 30%.

A.1 Discussion of some general impact factors of good practice exit hate crime work according to TPVR and LIPAV²

One of the most significant factors in the impact of *Violence Prevention Network's* (VPN) social-therapeutic group work techniques as well as of *Cultures Interactive's* (CI) approach of youth cultural social training has proved to be that the interventions were able to generate an interactive atmosphere in which a trusting and resilient relationship was established towards the facilitators as well as within the group itself. This "trust" proved to be essential, as an all-or-nothing condition, without which the pedagogic techniques and methodological exercises would have been of only limited impact and barely capable of prompting a lasting change in the individual's attitude and behaviour.

1 'Towards Preventing Violent Radicalisation' (TPVR, EU-Directorate ,Justice'); 'Literary and Media Interaction as Means of Understanding and Preventing Adolescent Violence and Extremism' (LIPAV, Marie-Curie-Program, Directorate Research).

2 The chapter contains sections from my recent paper: Harald Weilnböck: "'Violence Prevention Network' & 'Cultures Interactive': EU good-practice research on deradicalisation work in prison and community – and the factor of culture." In: Marc Coester, Erich Marks (Ed.): *International Perspectives of Crime Prevention 4: Contributions from the 4th and the 5th Annual International Forum 2010 and 2011 with the German Congress on Crime Prevention*. Godesberg: Forum Verlag 2012, pp. 33 - 52.

Why this should have been the case was not immediately obvious. Nevertheless, it was already known from empirical violence research that people tending towards violent and extreme behaviour live according to a marked system of distrust that can sometimes assume paranoid features.³ The question, however, as to how, in psychodynamic terms, this mistrust is conditioned and obtained, and above all how VPN's and CI's intervention method still managed to generate trust and resilience, remained for large parts of the research unanswered.

It was possible to isolate a few formal factors and then observe some important impact factors of good-practice deradicalisation work:

Non-governmental facilitators from outside

It seemed to be of utmost importance that the facilitators *come from outside* and not from within the environment of the institution itself. Obviously, the prison is particularly susceptible to distrust. It is very difficult for a prison psychologist to succeed in credibly guaranteeing the confidentiality of the conversation when he or she has a direct institutional involvement in decisions that are life-altering for the prisoner. However in any youth-work contexts of violence prevention, it generally also is recommended that the team be independent from the everyday contexts of the young people. Above all the components of the self-awareness group required a protected space that internal staff and facilitators would have been unable to provide.

Institutional support

That is by no means to say, however, that the institutional environment should remain uninvolved, or that it should not accept and absorb the external impulse, and support and extend it using the means available to it. On the contrary – and this is the second formal factor – the effectiveness of the two approaches (VPN and CI) was closely connected to the necessity of involving in the intervention's sphere of impact not only the young people themselves, but also and in principle the *institutions and local environments* to which they belong. It is therefore propitious and helpful when these institutions expressly signal their "respect" for these "outsiders", for example by simultaneously commissioning training for staff members and by seeking institutional consultancy. *Violence Prevention Network* therefore also often works with prison employees and takes on consultancy roles in higher-level administrative-technical and political structures. *Cultures Interactive* offers vocational training to social workers and school teachers. This consultancy activity gave rise to networking effects that in turn had a positive effect on the work with the young people themselves.

Working in the group and with the group

The third formal factor contributing significantly to the generation of trust and resilience, and thus to the lasting impulses for change that arose, is the fact that VPN's and CI's work is done *in the group and with the group*. The research interviews clearly indicate that the basic trust of the participants, and thus the degree of impact that the behaviour-altering effects have upon them, are crucially dependent upon a *group-dynamic* approach being taken. In other words, it is essential that attention is paid to the *processes* and the *development* of the participants in the group and their *relationships* towards each other, and that these processes and relations are conceived of as the primary object of the group work. It is clear that what is said and experienced by attentive and active participants in a professionally-led group goes much deeper and has a doubly lasting impact.

3 On the "paranoid style of attribution" in "violent imprisoned men" as well as the tendency towards "preventative attack", cf. Tedeschi, J.T. (2002): Die Sozialpsychologie von Aggression und Gewalt. In Heitmeyer/ Hagan: Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung, Westdeutscher Verlag. p. 585.

This observation seems to be particularly pertinent with the groups of young people at issue here, because almost all violent hate crimes are generated by clique behaviour – and thus are the product of uncontrolled processes of a so-called escalating *anti-group dynamic*.⁴ It is therefore all the more true to say that in both approaches an essential social-therapeutic goal of the work is the ability to enter into, maintain and make use of triangular (at the minimum), multi-pronged and complex group relationships. These methods of intervention therefore intuitively placed emphasis on demanding from their participants the art of talking openly and personally within the group, and of being confidential and discreet outside the group – without at the same time insisting that they be utterly silent and act as though they were members of a secret society.

Moreover, the ability to successfully practise trust, confidentiality and “respect” across the range of loyalties and group- and relationship-contexts in one’s life and school/work environment can be seen as the highest goal of *civic education*, in the post-classical sense of anti-bias work. After all, societies in which the opposite of freedom, liberality and non-violence predominate can be recognised simply enough by the absence in them of trust and confidentiality, and instead the presence of indiscretion/denunciation, intrigue, surveillance, fear/exercise of power, and selfish segregation – a misanthropic and anti-social situation that can exist in smaller or larger groups and for which terms such as “anti-democratic” or “extremist” are far too vague. It seems all the more appropriate, then, to aim for what can only be achieved through dynamic and open group work, namely to provide participants with the ability to find their way in a world consisting of occasionally conflicting and competing groups, and to provide them with the necessary abilities of self-integration and self-delineation.

More broadly, the findings also point to the fact that *the one-to-one supervisor*, no matter how talented, is unable to through his or her work to achieve this demanding pedagogic goal, and that the expectations and self-images of practitioners often equate to a systematic (self-)over-exertion that negatively affect the work. This is especially true for the target group in question here, since violent offenders, or those vulnerable to such behaviour, often grew up fatherless (because the fathers were absent either de facto or emotionally). They were thus socialised in a dyadic and *two-way relationship which tended to be symbiotic*, which was mostly cramped, insufficiently delineated and chronically over-exerted. For this reason, all social or psychotherapeutic interventions carried out between two people are subordinated to additional structural limits that, in the interest of quality assurance, should be cause for concern. Having said that, the two- or three-way conversation has an important *supplementary function* (especially in prison work) and is above all useful when individual results need to be consolidated or when individuals have to be stabilised because the group process becomes too intense for them – a permanent risk with precariously situated groups such as this. Accordingly, the results also indicated that a further formal factor influencing trust-building lies in the precise *dosage of group intensity*, which is regulated through being flexible in changing from the whole group to small groups and to two-way conversations, or through the change to pedagogic exercises and role-plays. Nevertheless, it appears to be crucial to the success of the work that *the group* always remains the main point of reference, against which the various individual measures are placed in perspective.

The facilitators’ professional persona

Above and beyond the formal factors, the interview material also raised connected questions as to how the *professional persona and group-interaction style* of the facilitator contributed to producing the aforementioned prerequisites for generating

4 On the other hand, it should be said that the psychopathic individual offender fundamentally requires forensic psychiatry and is out of place in normal prison and its capacity for intervention. It is particularly important to point this out given the misleading question occasionally expressed as to whether it does not constitute a limitation of a technique such as VPN that it only applies to a selected subgroup of violent offenders. It became evident that the technique, as soon as the necessary framework conditions are provided, can in principle be applied to all types and all degrees of crime. (And even in forensics, excellent work is done with – psychotherapeutic – groups.)

a climate of “trust and resilience”, and how the facilitator succeeded in moderating the interaction within the group in such a way as to be effective in terms of trust and hence of changing behaviour. There are many indications to suggest that the personal attitude of the facilitator represented a *direct influencing factor* – although such observations run the risk of being mystified as a personal talent, whereas in fact it is of a thoroughly technical nature and as such can be communicated and acquired.

Narrative mode of interaction

Analyzing VPN’s and CI’s methods revealed a central aspect of this personal facilitation style to be a kind of conversational and group guidance, which can be called the “*lifeworld*” mode (i.e. the immediate social environment of the person, including both private and professional areas of life) or briefly: the *narrative* mode of interaction. This denotes that the centre of the group’s attention is occupied by each participant and his or her self and personal experiences, and that the primary interest is the individual, lifeworld experiences of that particular person, to which the other group members relate at an equally personal level. Compared to this, all other components – teaching and training plans, exercises and definite pedagogic content – are secondary in value, because in order to be lastingly effective they depend on the existence of a relational basis that always offers the possibility for participants to confidently return to narrating their experiences.

In work with violent offenders, then, all morality and all judgements are initially dispensed with. Similarly, in local prevention work, where the primary concern is civil-societal issues of tolerance and diversity, or political educational issues of prejudices and group-directed misanthropy, then any argumentation, information and ethical or value-based considerations are initially put to one side. In both cases, the working approach is primarily concerned with the release of the individual, lifeworld narratives of the participants; with their *subjective experiential perspectives* and *biographical early histories* – and with the exchange of these perspectives with the other members of the group. In this respect, the two approaches intuitively followed the *pedagogical primacy of narration*, and discovered and took to heart the fact that people, especially when it comes to making lasting changes to their attitude and behaviour, open up when they are able to *develop their personal narration in a trusting relationship*, to do so in a way that reveals areas of their individual experience, and when they can share these perspectives with other people in a process of group exchange. Aspects of ethics, morality and judgement then seem to return of their own accord, not from the facilitators, but rather from personal motivation.

Of course, the experienced practitioner will hardly be surprised by this. It is well known that morality, judgement, arguments and information have always demonstrated limited effects; people have been quite right to warn against “overestimating” the “power of factual arguments” as opposed to the level of “feelings and emotions”⁵). This is truest of all for vulnerable youths, who automatically react with cynical contempt or inner retreat under pressure from moral or pedagogic values. Yet regardless of how well known this fact is, it often seems difficult to abandon the moral-judgemental impetus and to acquire and to put into practice a *facilitator style of lifeworld-narrative and relationship-based access*. This, at any rate, represented a particular challenge both for VPN and CI when it came to training new co-workers and introducing them to the work and the *facilitation style* of the approach – which was after all an innovative, self-developed approach.⁶

In concrete terms, the difficulty for methodological approaches like this consists primarily in motivating participants to even begin with *trusting narration* – given that as a rule they are often somewhat disinclined to talk about themselves and

5 Cf. Spangenberg, R.: <http://www.politische-bildung-brandenburg.de/extrem/praevention.html>

6 However it became all the more clear how necessary it is to continue, by means of systematic accompanying research, objectifying, documenting and didacticising good practice techniques, in order to provide orientation for further methodological developments in this and other areas of social work and “education”.

about emotional subjects. The ability to narrate in this sense of the term is a quite difficult skill that requires the person first recognises their own subjective narrative perspective as such, and that he or she is sufficiently familiar with its content in order then to be able to present narrative episodes as detailed and accessible stories and to exchange these stories with others. However the greatest objective difficulty is above all the fact that the personal experiences recalled by this group of participants, for example in the area of familial background, often involve exceedingly negative experiences that can only with considerable difficulty (or not at all) be narrated spontaneously – and as such, block other more immediate narrative content.

The skill of narrating is also difficult insofar as the narration – and this is especially the case with negative subject matters – can take a form that is always more or less *detailed and conducive to personal development*. As is well-known, one can “lie to oneself”, “kid” oneself and others, remember essential details “only dimly” and jointly cultivate anti-narrational defence mechanisms. On the other hand, together with the group, one can take risks in narrational self-discovery – which in principle produces social-therapeutic effects. From a narratological perspective, it should be recalled that psychotherapy as such is defined allegorically as the “continual re-telling of one and the same story”, only that this one story “is re-told ever better” (Roy Schafer). This can be taken to mean that, through narrative representation, the decisive episodes of a person’s biography and lifeworld can 1) be increasingly elaborated and completed, so that 2) they can gain increasing intensity in emotional expression and in the affective engagement of the narrator. Thereby the emotionality of the narration increasingly comes to approximate what was thought and felt during the experience itself.

This *process of narrative-forming* often extends to the listeners and co-narrators in the group, and/or is to a great extent prompted and supported by them.⁷ The “better” – in a narratological sense – the story is told, the greater the probability of releasing long-lasting impulses for personal change and development. From a scientific perspective, too, there is a great deal to be said for trying to elicit development-conducive forms of narrative in the group, and for that reason for the facilitator to adopt the attitude of *lifeworld-narrative and relationship-based access* as the benchmark for the group-culture being aimed for in the intervention.

Relationship-based narrative interaction

In view of the quite widespread programmes of fully modularised *cognitive-behavioural training* in various areas of socio-therapeutic and social work, it can be said that it is this very element of *lifeworld-narrative and relationship-based* interaction and *co-narrative* dynamic – often called also open-process interaction – which is missing there. Experienced practitioners in this field agree that the avoidance of narrative, open-process interaction goes back to an institutional and/or personal hesitation or inability to build trust and relationship with violent offenders and vulnerable people and that this, for a fair number of these training programmes, is the main reason of their relatively limited success in bringing about lasting effects.

How, then, did the facilitators proceed in order to initiate a *process* of narrative storytelling of this sort?

The attitude of critical attentiveness

Throughout it was possible to observe that the group and workshop facilitators in their own ways signalled *their personal readiness to enter a relationship*. In doing so, they made use in particular of the basic fact that the more one demonstrates a credible personal interest and a “*reliable attentiveness*”, the more open others are,

⁷ The biography researcher Gabriele Rosenthal has in this connection spoken of narrated and experienced life stories. In: (1995). *Erzählte und erlebte Lebensgeschichte. Gestalt und Struktur biographischer Selbstbeschreibungen*. Frankfurt a.M. (Campus). Rosenthal, G. (2004). *Biographical Research*. In: Seale, C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J.F. & Silverman, D. (Eds.). *Qualitative Research Practice*. London: Sage, 48-64.

both towards themselves and in the way they speak about themselves. However this attentiveness has to be entirely credible and to stand up to all kinds of testing – especially with young people, who relentlessly and minutely scrutinise their counterparts before they trust them.

As concerns the central question as to which further conditions need to be fulfilled so that this trustworthiness and attentiveness at the level of the personal relationship can be reliably applied, the evaluation resulted above all in two findings. Helpful, though as a rule overestimated, is the ability and the readiness of the facilitator to involve *themselves as a person* and sometimes also to reveal personal information about themselves, in order to appear to others as authentic and inspire trust. However this factor is in fact demanded by young people less than is generally thought – and sometimes feared. In most cases, the questioning from the adolescents is a matter of fairly uncomplicated and easily manageable initiatives in order to carry out a first contact probe, something that basically is very welcome. (Notably, in almost all cases the facilitators tended to respond to the questions directly and in a measured fashion, without insisting too soon on professional abstinence and neutrality, which comes into play at a later stage during more critical moments. The facilitators, with their process- and relation-oriented approach, go on the basis that a principled abstinence would – logically enough – be understood by the young people to mean that there is something else, something external, that is more important to the facilitator than the working relationship at hand, and that therefore that the young person him- or herself is of merely secondary importance).

On the other hand, what is generally underestimated, despite it being of central importance, is that the openness and the attentiveness of the facilitator, though thematically unrestricted, is by no means entirely unconditional. Successful praxis was characterised by the fact that the facilitator demonstrates an attitude that can be called an *attitude of critical attentiveness*. Essential for this is that the facilitator, alongside his or her credible guarantee of confidentiality and trustworthiness, also unreservedly expresses any (un)reasonable doubts, conjectures or enquiries concerning the statements, representations and stories of the participants, and that an atmosphere is thereby created in which everyone can show their true colours and thus, by daring to express themselves, enter into negotiations over their relationships. This is standard in dynamically-open group work; however by and large it is something that the young people have scarcely any experience of.

Critical attentiveness, in other words, deals with precisely this conflict-prone contact and the frictional points of reference, without of course acting in a way that is aggressive or deprecatory, or even overbearing or suggestive. It is far more the case that the facilitators pursued the goal of practising an exemplary mode of *respectful scepticism*, which does not jeopardise the dignity of the person, but which, on the contrary, for the first time gives the person's dignity its due. (While "human dignity" is only very formally guaranteed by an undifferentiated and contact-abstinent notion of tolerance or acceptance, in a successful negotiation of difference it can be properly given credit.) The *critical attentiveness* practised by these two approaches observes the basic difference between person and criminal offence, and thus corresponds to a fundamental attitude that is *as accepting as it is confrontational*.⁸ One might have thought that this combination would be impossible (at least if one bases one's assumptions on the discourse of classical political education or youth work), however it has proved essential as a technique of intervention.

Moreover, this combination contains a specific pedagogical value. The *attitude of critical attentiveness* involves the practice of a skill that this target group can be seen to be sorely lacking, yet one they urgently need to learn: the ability to get

⁸ Also cf. Harris, D.M., Selyn, J. & Bush J.: Positive and Supportive Authority: An Approach to Offender Management and Supervision (in preparation) and: Harris, D.M. & Riddy, R. (2008). The Thinking Skills Programme Facilitation Manual. Ministry of Justice. Harris, D.M. & Bush, J. (2010). One to One Cognitive Self Change. NOMS Cymru.

along with people who are very “different”, to overcome large subjective perceptions of difference, and to act acceptingly-attentively as well as, in critical moments, critically-confrontationally. They must also learn to maintain this ability in emotionally dynamic group situations – and not to react, as they had previously, with avoidance, uncompromising schism or violent escalation.

The factor of culture/ media

Particularly as concerns the “lifeworld-narrative” technique, the “*culture factor*” opens up a highly original spectrum of methodological possibilities – that are not yet systematically used by *Violence Prevention Network*, but showed their potential with the work of *Cultures Interactive*. The trusting narration of personal experience can be particularly effectively prompted and intensified using cultural and fictional narrative and/or individual creativity. Particularly with youths from problem areas, a group which is hard to reach, *Cultures Interactive* employs forms of praxis taken from urban youth culture that offer the young adults readily accessible methods for personal self-expression, and which can thereby help to attain a significant deepening of the pedagogic process. Even drawing on films or song texts that the participants indicate to be personally important or interesting, opens up numerous possibilities for working on biographical or lifeworld experiences, which can then be taken up in the group discussion. In a person’s mental handling of a fictional narrative of his or her own choice, particular personal themes or “developmental challenges” are consistently brought to the fore that can be used for the shared process. Of course the prerequisite for this is that a *lifeworld-narrative and relationship-based access* approach is used and that the facilitator practises an *attentive-critical attitude*.

Risk and pitfalls of behaviourist traditions

In comparison with the fundamentally different, what could be called behaviouristic, approaches, it can be said that, when taken out of context, individual elements of a complex technique like the VPN or CI approach have proven barely to function and sometimes even to be unadvisable – in other words, to remove particular exercises, role-plays, methods of arrangement or didactic modules of civic education from the concept as a whole, and to practise them outside the trusting, process-based and relational context of the directed group, will have little success. Even maintaining the process-based context requires that care must be taken not to carry out the modules, exercises and role-plays etc. too early, before the framework of trust necessary for lifeworld narrative work has been reliably generated. This is because there is a danger that the exercises are only performed by the participants for the sake of politeness, or that they descend into more or less open boredom, and that the biographical investigations remain superficial and clichéd.

The *even greater risk* of a technique that tries to employ selected exercises while dispensing with the context of relations, process and group, is that in acutely emotional situations particularly vulnerable individuals will enter states of fear and rage, since they are unable to rely on the security of a relational framework of trust, one that because of their psychologically fragile condition they absolutely require. Methods such as the “*hot seat*”, where the violent offender is provoked with insults and physical assault, so that he learns not to lose control and resort to violence, need to be cautioned against. People that have learned both the narrative and the pure training approaches were able to provide particularly useful assessments here. External assessments also reached the conclusion that methodically isolated provocation exercises of this sort are disadvantageous. They run the danger of exacerbating precisely what these young people can do all too well (and what is not good for them): bottling things up and hanging in there, until in real life the affect breaks out – at the expense of others. A *critical-attentive* attitude and systematic relational and narrative work in the trust-framework of the group is therefore an essential prerequisite if individual exercises and modules are to have a lasting and

low-risk impact. It is all the more important to emphasise this, since in the last decade anti-aggression work has been strongly characterised by such approaches.⁹

A.2 Observational criteria for success in anti hate crime work

As criteria for spotting success in deradicalisation work, indicating that participants begin to embark on favourable changes of attitude and behaviour, it was found that success in deradicalisation is signalled by any signs which indicate that the offender:

- (1) Has begun to build a greater degree of *personal confidence and trust* with facilitators and with the group – and thus increased his capacity to built trust in relationships even during conflicting and challenging phases of (group) interaction.
- (2) Has begun to build a new attitude about and appreciation for *personal memories* and for the emotional experience of *remembering personally lived-through events* – in particular positively charged events.
- (3) Has begun to develop a new sense and appreciation for *telling stories/* narrating personally experienced occurrences – regardless of what scope and significance the experience has – and for actively listening to such narrations, and thus increased his/her capacity to *partake in narrative interaction*.
- (4) Has had experiences of *emotional learning / building emotional intelligence* and thus has begun to realise and reflect upon one's own personal emotions and about situations of emotional involvement – in particular situations and emotions of embarrassment/shame, insecurity, fear, and helplessness.
- (5) Has acquired some recognition of *personal ambivalence* and has thus experienced that he himself and/or others often are of two minds about concrete real-life situations and that one has to make decisions and negotiate a compromise.
- (6) Has begun to build a new appreciation for and capacity to *argue or struggle with others in non-destructive ways* – be it issues of political, religious, or personal nature, i.e. to argue without either turning verbally abusive or withdrawing from the interaction.

A.3 Summing up: impact factors and practice guidelines for anti hate crime and deradicalisation interventions according to TPVR and LIPAV

In view of these basic criteria of favourable personal changes, the following impact factors and practice-guidelines for deradicalisation work could be determined. The methodological prerequisites of any successful approach are:

- (i) that the facilitators of the pedagogic intervention come from *outside the institution* and are able to act independently; this is required in light of the indispensable process of confidence-building which is generally most difficult to achieve with this target group; being able to provide a *secure and confidential space* for the participants to speak and interact seems to be one of the most important success factors of the intervention approach;
- (ii) that the *institution* does, however, signal its high esteem of the incoming outside facilitators (which requires containment of any impulses of professional competitiveness or feelings of envy) and that the institution itself is *interested and actively involved* – for example in staff training or workshops given by these facilitators;
- (iii) above all, that significant parts of the work takes place *in the group and with the group*, and thus attention is paid to the processes and developments in and of the

⁹ It is possible to learn this lesson through a similar methodological trend in psychotherapy: the family arrangement of Bert Hellinger. Here, the long-established and highly effective methodological element of "family constellation" has been removed from the therapeutic (trust) framework and been used as an isolated – and sensational – technique. The bitter consequence has been psychiatric detentions and suicides, as well as occasionally highly questionable ideological implications.

participants and their *group-dynamic* relationships with one another; this prerequisite is due to the fact that hate crimes are generally group-dynamically induced and that hate crime offenders have often been raised in overexerted one-to-one relationships to their single parents – and therefore are all the less experienced in and more vulnerable to escalating group dynamics;

(iv) that a *conducive dosage* of group intensity (offset with pedagogical exercises and supplementary-supportive one-to-one conversations) is borne in mind;

(v) that the professional persona and intervention style of the facilitator focuses on generating a *trusting and resilient* relationship, both in the group and in the one-to-one sessions, and that this relationship is constantly nurtured;

(vi) but also, that a facilitator style of *critical attentiveness* is adopted which also seeks out points of contention and conflict, at the same time observing the basic distinction between the person, which is accepted, and the offence, which is confronted – so that a *respectfully-enquiring exchange* can proceed *both acceptingly and confrontationally*;

(vii) that on the basis of this relationship a mode of *lifeworld-narrative* and *relationship-based* access to the young people is created that enables a *trusting and development-conducive* narrative about personal experience;

(viii) that the factor of *civic education*, political and ideological exchange as well as the *factor of culture* is incorporated (for instance in the form of fictional media narratives) in order to add to the experiential depth of the pedagogical process;

(ix) that the intervention on the whole does, however, not feel compelled to follow an entirely strict syllabus; due to the above stated principle of the *lifeworld-narrative* and *relationship-based* approach, the need for an *open process* is acknowledged in which the participants group's spontaneous issues are given priority;

(x) the principle of working with an open process *lifeworld-narrative* and *relationship-based* approach also implies *methodological flexibility* and *eclecticism* with regard to pedagogic tools and therapeutic resources. In particular, these two studies and other topical studies and evaluations have recently demonstrated the pitfalls and deficits of two approaches which have been quite predominant during the last decade: (a) pure *anti-aggression training* by itself as well as (b) fully modularised *cognitive-behavioural training* seems to have had less effect than previously assumed – unless they are embedded into and offset with an open-process narrative framework of proceedings;

(xi) that *protective relationships* are inaugurated already during prison time, calling on suitable family members, friends or community members whose personality fits the needs and challenges of reintegrating hate crime offenders;

(xii) that *post-release coaching* is put into place which assists the ex-offender in beginning his new life in the community.

B The recent evaluation of the Federal Government Model-Project Programme on approaches with young people that are drawn towards right-wing extremism ('Diversity' / 'Vielfalt')¹⁰

• Direct "conflict management" and the factors of "lifeworld" and "socio-emotional development"

The findings of the recently concluded evaluation of the *Federal Programmes for the Promotion of Democracy* (Diversity 2010) which included programmes for combating political/religious extremism and youth violence ("Abschlussbericht - Vielfalt") reconfirm the above listed evaluation results of the TPVR and LIPAV good-practice research projects.

A brief glance at the range of existing government programmes – and especially the category of model projects in right-wing extremism prevention – will therefore underpin and complement our results to a great extent. At the same time, an overview will be given of the current state of methodological development and the situation in general, including discourses and debates in the field of open youth work in Germany. Later, the perspective will be extended to European Union projects in progress, so that experiences from the international field of hate crime and extremism prevention can be included.

• The need to work with the difficult to engage (young) offenders

In the introductory summary of the final report, the publishing office of the federal ministry summarises the "key message" of the expert commentary, specifically emphasising that "against the background of experience gained from implementation (of the model projects in particular) attention [should] be given to juveniles at increased risk of 'right-wing extremist orientation'" (3). Together with strengthening the forces of civil society and registering and prosecuting offences, it recommends the further testing of carefully adapted and effective methods of establishing a pedagogical rapport not only with those "at risk of right-wing extremism" but also with young people who already have a strong "right-wing extremist orientation". The implication is that this task, probably the most difficult within this area of work, has been under-represented in the model projects, which could point to great methodological challenges in that area.

• Working with personal conflict and psychological dynamics

In addition, both the expert commentary and the appendices "strongly support" the recommendation of the report that "in future the emphasis should be placed more on the perspective of conflict transformation" with these juveniles (and local responsible people), and that, accordingly, the title of future programmes of this federal promotion should be "*Conflict Management* in the context of Right-wing Extremism, Youth and Local Democracy". This is in line with the above recommendation. Here again, albeit indirectly, attention is drawn to the fact that many model projects of right-wing extremism prevention – and this is generally true of the majority of civil society initiatives in east and west Germany in the last decade – tend to take place away from the problem areas and more at the margins of the phenomenon of right-wing extremism, for example, "at an institutional (e.g. school) level or at an individual level (help in a single case)"; either this or they offer short-term victim support and limited "crisis intervention". Here, consultancy and instruction functions dominate, aimed at promoting understanding of democracy and general support for the civil society ethos of the groups and local authorities concerned (Full Report of Expert Commentary [EC] in Thematic Cluster 2 [TC 2], 5, and 7.1, 68).

¹⁰ Abschlussbericht der Bundesprogramme „Vielfalt tut gut“. Jugend für Vielfalt, Toleranz und Demokratie“ und „kompetent. für Demokratie – Beratungsnetzwerke gegen Rechtsextremismus“ (2010). Förderphase 2007 – 2010. Hg. von der Regiestelle Vielfalt. Gsub – Gesellschaft für soziale Unternehmensberatung mbH, Berlin. 2010.

- **Reluctance to deal with difficult to engage offenders**

On the other hand, there seems to be a certain caution about direct access to the target group of “more seriously at-risk” or “*right-wing extremist oriented young persons*”. This reserve may justifiably be attributed to the great – and to some degree unacknowledged – uncertainty that appears to characterise the field of youth work when the concrete question arises about the best educational approach in dealing with these juveniles. It has often been found that open youth work practitioners operating within highly problematic catchment areas are puzzled as to how they can find and implement stable and educationally effective ways of coping with widespread anti-democratic, xenophobic and right-leaning youth environments. In view of the complexity and methodological difficulty of youth work in socially sensitive areas, this uncertainty is only too understandable. This is compounded by the fact that, although the ministry recommends that, in future, a strategy of direct “conflict management” in the immediate “context of right-wing extremism” be pursued (in other words, direct work with the target group and its social environment) there are no generally available programmes of educational intervention. These programmes need first to be developed in model projects – and then, of course, mainstream them throughout the relevant institutions.

- **Cognitive versus emotional learning – don’t “overstress educational topics”, instead emphasise “subject-focus, emotional processes and identity issues” during the intervention**

The ministry’s final report also states that “one weakness of the federal programme [is] the tendency to *overstress the educational topic* and to under-emphasise the aspect of *subject-focus*”, meaning, in particular, areas such as individual “identity formation” and “conflict” and the subjective “need for recognition”. The report agrees that it was “probably right” to focus on “the idea of education” (especially, for example, in Thematic C 3, which deals with the intercultural concerns of the immigrant society). Yet “people did not acquire the ability to deal with cultural diversity because they were told over and over again that it is a ‘good thing’”; it could only be developed as a personal process “gradually, through conflictive experience”. The report continues that it should be borne in mind that the dominance of the topic of “education” often went along with an “overemphasis on knowledge-oriented and *cognitive aspects*”, which, moreover, were implemented “in the context of *short-term interventions*” as individual events or teaching modules. This was less favourable from the educational point of view. It would be preferable for consideration to be also given to “*emotional processes*” which were in keeping with “a methodology oriented towards *long-term developments*”.

What is stated in the above comment with regard to TC 3 (“immigrant society”) applies even more to TC 2 – “youth susceptible to right-wing extremism”. On this subject, the report of the expert commentary (EC) more emphatically states: The “short-term workshop activities concentrating primarily on the cognitive area [appear] rather unconvincing”; a better “criterion of the quality of preventative work” is the question as to whether the organisers “succeed in adequately addressing the *social and emotional sensitivities* of young people” – particularly when the target group is inclined to violence and extremism. For this reason “the over-emphasis on a cognitively oriented methodology should be supplemented by learning processes on the emotional level” (brief summary of EC for TC 3, 2009, 3).

- **The power of prejudices comes from emotion – not cognition**

As early as the interim report at the end of the first year “the EC [found it noticeable] that at the present moment, *emotional and affective aspects* were not given sufficient consideration in the various approaches adopted by the model projects”. At this point the EC confesses to considerable surprise at this deficiency, since “investigations [...] in the field of social psychology” had long since proved beyond reasonable doubt “that the *power of prejudices to exert influence* is closely linked to emotion and affect” (Annual report of EC for TC 3, 2008, 4). The implication is that this makes it all the

more incomprehensible that so little emphasis is placed on this well-known core psycho-social problem area. The expert commentary is therefore keen to highlight, as a “key aspect of collaboration” with the model projects, the question of “the *‘emotional motivation’* that leads [young people] to hold such ‘closed world views’” – as well as the question of how this problem, together with the social-educational practice built on it, “can be taken account of in the work of the model projects” in the future.

Evidently the two reports have in mind both the realities of so-called “*modern right-wing extremism*” and the *family-related and biographical complexity* of the motives for resorting to it (about which more will be said below in the light of Köttig’s biographical researches). The ministerial final report emphasises that “the expert commentary regards the interaction between modern right-wing extremism and democracy as [fundamentally] a *societal conflict*” (21) which affects the entire community. It also explicitly points out that, “in principle, *children and young people* are also involved”, since, firstly, “modern right-wing extremism makes [...] concrete appeals to young people in particular”, where “there may be a *subjective demand* for it.” Secondly, “these conflicts have an impact” at different levels “in the *lifeworlds of children and young people*” – meaning that anti-democratic, anti-liberal and latently extremist attitudes are also widespread in much of normal adult society. The conflictual phenomenon of “right-wing extremism” can even be found in the “families and relationship networks of children”, and the psycho-social “appraisal of the phenomenon” might actually “increase young people’s vulnerability to the dangers of right-wing extremism”. And this, of course, will not be any different with Jihadist social milieus.

“Subject orientation, relationship to the lifeworld and sensitivity to conflict”, as well as consideration of aspects of the “socio-emotional” development of the individual “thus appear to be [...] key quality criteria”, which are crucial for the investigation and assessment of sustainable preventative-educational approaches (21).

With regard to the institutional implementation on the ground, the report stresses that work in this complex field is particularly successful “when the project partners make a long-term commitment to the specific situation.” It is important here to include the relevant local authority or appropriate institutions (e.g. the prison) over a long period and to involve them in the implementation through “*sustainable and ‘open-minded’ cooperative relationships*”. This reflects the experience of the best practice approaches that process-open social-therapeutic work always requires close cooperation with the institutional environment.

- **“Cognitive level of ideologies” generally not crucial – what counts is “people’s lifeworld and psycho-affective experiences”**

The *comments* appended to the expert commentary (contained in the CD included in the final report) emphasise many of the above findings – and also touch on additional aspects. One of these comments, which initially does not refer to the prison-based model projects at all, but to projects of regional prevention work in east German districts, admits that *ideological and cognitive* matters undoubtedly play a part in extremism prevention and that “with highly ‘conflict-latent’ young people whose inhumane tendencies are group-related”, two clear elements of ideological orientation could be discerned”: firstly, right-wing extremism, and secondly, Islamism. On the other hand, the experience of this model project provider has been that time after time there are *non-specific, mixed “behavioural profiles of ‘conflictivity’*” behind empirical hate crimes, which at times are structured in an “idiosyncratic or, quite simply, delinquent” manner. In practice, this is thought to show that the “cognitive level of ideologies” is generally not as crucial as might at first appear, and that for this reason work needs to concentrate on “young people’s *lifeworld and psycho-affective experiences*” (63), before there can be any hope of a *personal change of attitude* in the sphere of ideology.

- **Strengthen professional attitude and quality management**

Moreover, the report adds the explicit recommendation that “the linking of *group-centred* work with more individually oriented activities” is desirable (2), in particular with a view to “the strengthening of professionalism and the *establishment of a system of quality management*”, which would be of great benefit to this difficult work. Wisely, the report warns that “quality management [does] not [mean] administrative control”, a misconception that can all too easily arise in the always tense relationship between representatives of the public services and voluntary bodies. Quite rightly, the EC stresses – in a rather inconspicuous note – that especially “concerning the local and institutional contexts”, prevention work in the “interaction field of right-wing extremism” is at all times “heavily reliant on competencies in conflict management”, simply because conflicts with representatives of state and local institutions are to be expected (brief summary by EC for TC 2, 2009, p. 2). “Quality management” therefore includes not only a “group-centred” methodology, but also needs to be conscious of its systemic and institutional dimension, which requires appropriate self-reflexive methods.

- **Party-political discourses from left to right: debates on “long-term/ short-term” interventions and “quick fixes”**

As well as giving explicit support for the final report, however, the comment refers to a further matter, namely that in the final months of the period covered by the federal programme “there has often been discussion among colleagues [...] about the advantages and disadvantages of aspects of ‘the long-term as opposed to the short-term’ with regard to measures to be taken”. This is expressed in a note which, at least indirectly, points to the dual structure of the programme, which is divided into two distinct branches of activity, comprising on the one hand medium-term *model projects* for the thorough development of new approaches that will be effective for a long period, and on the other hand provides for shorter-term *action plans* for consultation and intervention of limited duration, created for particular occasions.

Above all, however (although it is never mentioned in so many words), what comes into play here is the effect of *party-political discourses*, which, independently of country and cultural background, are always of great importance for projects of deradicalisation. What actually prompts this remark regarding the debates on “long-term / short-term” is concern about the differing levels of awareness of the problem of “right-wing extremism” on the part of the major political parties. This was also clearly discernible in the interviews with best practice employees and organisers. After all, in the history of the *various federal and provincial governments* of recent decades – as also in the work carried on in local districts of differing political colour – it has been observable that commitment to the implementation of civic federal programmes can vary considerably (these programmes, as a general rule, require fifty per cent co-financing by the *Länder* and the active cooperation of local institutions).

Until recently it has been – and to some extent still is – not unusual to find that conservatives assess the dangers to society from right-wing extremism as far less serious than do left-wing and social-democratic politicians, under whose aegis the “diversity” federal programme was set up. The tendency to cut or divert funds intended for right-wing extremism prevention programmes has varied accordingly. Even today, there often seems to be a rigid conservative world view, as expressed in the “Historians’ Dispute” in the 1980s, that the blame for the ideological radicalisation and the epidemic of violence afflicting the entire twentieth century lies more with “communism” and less with “fascism”, and certainly not with the great social upheavals, thrusts towards modernity and inequalities of this period. But such imponderable historical and philosophical speculation, which reaches far back in the past, often seems to obscure any clear understanding of the risks arising from today’s youth extremism and neo-extremism – as well as historically new fundamentalisms associated with migration, such as Islamism / Jihadism.

- **“Misconceived short-term orientation ... (can have) disastrous consequences”**

Inferences can be drawn from this historical constellation as to how great the influence exerted by the broader party-political and societal context can be, and how this context can add a factor of *societal-discursive* and *administratively conditioned* instability to the specific methodological complexity of youth preventative work. One can well understand the personal uncertainty felt by practitioners engaged in the most difficult social-therapeutic work, if they are not unreservedly given responsibility and support by politicians and society. From this perspective one can also better understand the significance of the comment (in the appendix) that stresses the concern that at certain “political levels of decision-making” there might be an inclination to cut funding for *long-term “model projects”* for developing and testing methods of right-wing extremism prevention, while at the same time continuing to support short-term “action plans” involving purely reactive and short-term intervention and consultancy – since these could superficially appear to be “comparatively cost-effective”.

It also becomes clearer why the expert commentary “unequivocally endorses” the view that “approaches that adapt to a specific situation for an extended period” and aim for “group-centred work” and “sustainable and cooperative relationships with the local authorities” “have proved to be the most convincing” (63). This is not to deny that both pillars of the programme – the long-term structure-building pillar and the short-term ad hoc variety – are meaningful and necessary. But only the model projects with a *“long-term” methodological development* perspective can indicate to practitioners that the problem is being taken sufficiently seriously by the political class – and that the political and administrative office-holders are reliable partners. (In the case of predominantly cognitive-informational activities, “short-term workshops” and crisis interventions, this is generally regarded as doubtful.)

The significance and interference potential that can come from political, societal and administrative contexts and discourses can therefore not be overestimated. It is for these reasons that the above comment expressly emphasises “how risky it would be if social planning were to follow a trend towards *short-term orientation*” and if “misconceptions about the functions and effects of (more long-term) ‘model projects’ were to persist”. The comment demonstrates that the experts see a definite risk of “the same mistakes being made again and considerable structural losses being incurred”. This comment’s author – coming from the field of community work – illustrates this by pointing to two *“widely known”* examples that show that, “in the past, in similar fields of intervention”, approaches to action based on “misconceived short-term orientation” had become established, “with disastrous consequences”. These examples pertain firstly to “re-integration and prevention of re-offending among young violent offenders”, in particular to one specific method of “anti-aggression training”, and, secondly, to “therapy for family-related social and psychological disturbance through so-called ‘family constellations’”.

- **The pitfalls of behaviourist ‘anti-aggression training’ – the “hot seat” method**

The author of the comment goes on to explain that in re-offence prevention work with young violent offenders in the past, it has “sometimes been customary to employ focal and *short-term ‘anti-aggression training’*”. When the author adds that “this highly concentrated method [is] also *extremely media friendly*” and can easily be communicated to “a professional audience or the general public” and “in individual cases even [permits] sensational insights”, the context aspect of the *media and public impact* and *sensationalism* comes into view. This combined with “the relative cost effectiveness” of these methodological approaches meant that they quickly – and somewhat prematurely – gained popularity in the relevant institutions. In the meantime, however, it had become “increasingly clear that there must be serious doubts about the effectiveness and sustainability of such methods (and at times also

about the ethical implications, for example when the client is placed on the 'hot seat' and subjected to aggressive provocation and insults)". Many prisons and regional justice ministries, particularly in the south of the country (the author goes on), have since discontinued the practice.

Although the accuracy of these comments cannot be verified in detail here, they nevertheless call to mind the statement made in an interview by a group facilitator with professional experience of both methodological approaches – the more short-term, behavioural anti-aggression training and the medium-term, process- and relationship-based group work. The group facilitator stated that his experience of the *hot seat* method had been "predominantly negative" and that he had therefore looked for methodological alternatives. The provocation exercises prescribed by this approach usually lacked the necessary foundation of memory, reflection and relationship work. With the "hot seat" you know what's coming, you just have to hold on, hold on, hold on [...] you can prepare for it, then you can get through it." The key methodological problem with this behaviourist oriented training is basically that the young people are "strengthened in the very thing that [they] can do perfectly well anyway" – but which is not good for them: "If the lads have learned anything in life it is: just take it and endure it until you reach breaking point". This breaking point cannot be effectively prevented by means of behavioural training alone.

- **The pitfalls of de-contextualised family constellations (Bert Hellinger)**

The above quoted expert's comment continues by referring to the structurally similar problems that have affected "the 'constellation' methods employed in therapy for family-based disorders", which have enjoyed phases of great popularity in recent years. These methods have made "an even greater impression on the media and the public" than the anti-aggression training of the hot seat. This seems to be a reference to the increasingly controversial *family constellations* practised by Bert Hellinger, which are indeed short-term and cost effective – but which, disastrously, are usually performed with a complete lack of processual memory work, reflection and relationship work, without which no such intensive therapeutic element can be responsibly and effectively employed. For instance, "considerable doubts arose about the therapeutic efficacy of this type of family constellation. Furthermore, it became increasingly obvious sometimes there could be huge risks to the mental health of the persons taking part."

None of this can be verified in detail here. What is certainly undeniable, however, is the principle of taking individual – and sensational – methodological tools *out of their therapeutic context* and using them *in isolation*. As with provocation exercises, what occurs in the case of Hellinger is that a proven and highly effective methodological element, the spatial "constellation" of family-dynamic issues, is taken out of the therapeutic context of responsibility and used as an isolated measure – one that is sure to be widely reported in the media. In the case of both methods, then, single elements are "lifted" in a questionable manner and applied "in a focal and short-term way". It can, however, be helpful to consider the individual tools in the context of the work process and then to select those that are appropriate and use them, by agreement, in small doses.

Whenever individual elements are lifted there are indications of institutional pressure for a *short-term approach* and for *cost reduction*, and/or there is *pressure from the media* to come up with memorable and moving scenes. As a consequence, serious risks to the quality and sustainability of the psycho-therapeutic or social-therapeutic work have to be reckoned with. A closer look at the best practice approaches method – and its transferability to other EU contexts – showed, after all, how questionable it is to isolate individual elements from the complex total process, for example to pick out particular exercises, role-plays, constellation methods or civic education teaching tools. Experience has shown that it is not advisable to apply these methodological elements in a behaviourist-oriented manner and to apply them outside of the trust-based and relationship-based context of the therapeutically facilitated group. It has

already been shown how important it is not to carry out these modules and exercises prematurely, even where the responsible process context was guaranteed, before the framework of lifeworld-narrative work had been reliably established in the group. Here the danger exists that the subjects merely participate in these modules and exercises out of politeness, or sink into more or less unacknowledged apathy – and that biographical and/or narrative probing remains superficial and insubstantial.

The even greater risk inherent in a method that lacks any context of process, relationship or group is the possibility that particularly susceptible individuals end up in acute states of emotional intensity, fear and rage or even suffer a nervous breakdown, because they lack the safety net of secure group relationships and mutual trust – a context they sorely need, given their often unrecognised psychological frailty. This danger exists just as much with hot seat methodologies as it does with sensationalist family constellations (which have apparently led to referrals to psychiatric hospital and/or suicide attempts¹¹).

Overall, it is possible to observe clearly the extent to which *deradicalisation* represents a profoundly societal factor, one which is exposed to many external disruptive influences. If party political discourses start to give rise to doubts about support from political and societal areas for essential and difficult civic interventions (and the *latent radicality* of large groups of citizens makes itself felt), and if marked preferences for sensationalist perspectives become apparent and the interest of media enterprises in sensationalist reporting grows, these contextual factors will represent an additional challenge to the work of deradicalisation that cannot be ignored. Process-open approaches react to all this with a fair amount of flexibility, by including examples of reporting or other media elements directly in the work.

- **How political discourses may lead to counterproductive reassignments of funds: the German government's current political agenda – in contrast with European strategies for the prevention of extremism and hate crime**

All the more remarkable – and worrying – is the fact that the new strategic direction announced by the current *party-politically "conservative" federal government* for the funding period from 2011 onward seems to specifically contradict the findings of the expert commentary in essential points – and thus, in a curious way, to run *diametrically counter* to its own final report. Contrary to the recommendation of the final report, which essentially builds on the expert commentary, funding for "model projects" based on long-term, process-oriented methodology development and "subject orientation" has been reduced to about half the previous level. On the other hand, there has been a corresponding increase in the budget for short-term interventions based on consultancy and crisis management – which are, of course, necessary, but can only have a very indirect effect on the sustainable development of the structure and competence of regions under strain. In addition, there is the aforementioned – and highly questionable – emphasis on work to counter left-wing extremism.

Furthermore, it seems that independent expert analysis, which in the interests of process-oriented "formative evaluation" and scientifically supported quality assurance had accompanied the development of each project, has been stopped, or at least more closely tied to the ministry and oriented towards quantification of results. Critics have therefore controversially accused certain parts of the government of having been prepared to scrap the entire programme against right-wing extremism – and when this proved politically unfeasible, to modify it as far as possible in a "conservative" direction.

11 Cf. Bundesverband Sekten- und Psychomarktberatung e.V. (www.agpf.de) and 'Der Spiegel' 7/2002, p. 200f.

The aforementioned concerns, which engaged social workers have expressed when faced by the lack of seriousness and reliability shown by party politics, seem by no means exaggerated or irrational. The fear does indeed seem justified that a “trend towards *short-term orientation* in social planning” could result in “the same mistakes being made again and considerable structural losses being incurred”. To be precise, it is to be feared that the “subject orientation” of prevention work, of which the best practice approaches method are examples and which the research findings prove to be so indispensable, may once more be lost sight of. What is more, it is foreseeable that “conflict management” and “identity formation”, the systematic management of individual “recognition” problems on the “psycho-affective”, “subject” level, the awareness of the significance of “emotion and affect” as a contributory cause of resentment and the readiness to use violence (which has been known about for a long time), that all these essentially psycho-social problem dimensions, which have recently been rediscovered and incorporated into the development of the model project and into social work, are in danger of being passed over again and forgotten.

Instead, there could be a return to a situation in which measures are taken that tend to function in the “short-term” and are “knowledge-oriented and cognitive”, and in which ad hoc consultation and crisis intervention are employed. This means that there could again be a “tendential *over-emphasis of the topic of education*” in the “cognitive” and “informational” sense, together with a “relative under-emphasis of *the subject dimension*”, despite the fact that the final report explicitly named this as “a weakness of the federal programme”. One might be tempted to add that this change of policy has occurred despite (or precisely because of) the incapacity of short-term and knowledge-oriented measures to bring a solution to the problem closer, even if they do fulfil a social alibi function in the sense of “we’re doing what we can”, which satisfies the public conscience.

The further development and establishment of rediscovered methods based on “personal-civic education” or on “lifeworld-narrative” and biographical orientation will thus fade from view once more. There is a danger that the awareness may diminish that the whole of society and the local community face a challenge from extremism/fundamentalism and anti-democratic attitudes due to the existence of risk factors and affinities even in the moderate centre of society. Even the awareness of the importance of the aforementioned “family and network” contexts of susceptible “children and young people”, who for structural reasons have developed “a corresponding *subjective demand*” for what right-wing extremism has to offer, is in danger of fading. Together with the loss of this awareness is also a danger of losing the methodological know-how that enables practitioners to deal effectively with such affinities in a socio-educational manner, a know-how that – as the findings of the expert commentary have shown – needs to be developed and tested a great deal more in order to be able to offer intervention procedures of optimal efficacy.

It is also hard to imagine how the development of “sustainable and open-minded *cooperative relationships*” with those responsible “on the ground”, which is regarded as so important, is to be pursued – and how what has been developed can be prevented from being lost once more. It can also be predicted that the strengthening of practitioners’ “professionalism” and “quality management”, which the report explicitly recommends should include “professional (case) supervision”, may also not happen.

The current federal government thus seems to be treating the societal problem of right-wing extremism – especially, but not exclusively, in the severely challenged *Länder* of eastern Germany – not as being deep-rooted but as something that crops up here and there; a problem that does not need a fundamental solution but that can be dealt with on an ad hoc basis through crisis intervention teams and victim support “as and when required” and in the “short-term”.

- **The EU Stockholm Programme – evidence-based, promising strategies for Europe**

A look to the *European Union*, however, provides food for thought. For some time now, motivated by the pressing nature of the problem, serious and systematic work on “*deradicalisation*”, extremism prevention and defence against terrorism has been underway there. These concerns are seen by the EU as broad problem areas affecting the whole of society, and are considered in a consistent and objective manner. In particular, the EU freely admits that this difficult work has little chance of success without the close involvement, on an equal footing, of non-governmental organisations and non-profit organisations (NGOs/NPOs) and their methodologically innovative and practical model project developments. In the words of the deradicalisation strategy document of the 2009 *Stockholm Programme*, which is binding on all future EU policy: “Key to our success will be the degree to which non-governmental groups [...] across Europe play an active part”. The foundational and practical research already undertaken by the EU concludes that “addressing this challenge is beyond the power of governments alone” (Counter Terrorism Strategy 14469/4/05). What is needed is commitment by “civil society”, i.e. “communities”, “regional organisations”, “faith groups”, “religious authorities” and “other organisations”, i.e. community-based non-governmental organisations from the voluntary sector. According to the strategy document, this is the only way to deal with the phenomenon “more effectively at the grass-roots level” (Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2005, 8, and ISEC Call).

- **The importance of community organisations, NGOs and non-profit “social entrepreneurs”**

This confirms the finding of the ministry’s final report of the federal programmes, which also stresses that neither federal and provincial administrations nor the decentralised consultancies, acting alone, are capable of achieving sustainable deradicalisation and methodological development. Without the local authorities and without *sponsoring organisations that are independent of political parties (NGOs)*, which function as medium-term local community factors on the ground, it is scarcely possible to make a sufficient impact. Above all, governmental or purely advisory external institutions are generally incapable of mastering what the final report terms the “socio-emotional”, social-psychological and relational dimensions of this difficult task. Therefore the European Commission’s Stockholm Programme explicitly demands that the motivational and emotional aspect of the problem should receive attention, e.g. by considering “the motivations of terrorists” – thus continuing to keep in mind and systematically take into account the “subject level” and “identity” concerns of radicalised or at-risk young people. It was further decided to take precise note of “the increased vulnerability of some places” (ISEC Call) – i.e. of some social zones and communities – from the social-psychological point of view, and to draw appropriate methodological conclusions from this. This EU strategy is based on many national and international studies such as Precht’s study in Denmark from 2007: “Local communities and dialogue play essential roles in counter-radicalisation measures. Local communities can better than anyone else spot and maybe prevent young people from entering extremism” (81) or the German BKA study (see Lützinger report, Section D).

The *non-governmental organisations* (and their factually-based scientific support) are indispensable because – as empirical field surveys by the EU have shown in recent years – only the specialised NGOs, which have no government connections and work in the field, are able to build *the necessary trust* among people and (ethnic) groups. This trust is now seen in EU research – as well as in this study – as vital if a lasting social-therapeutic effect in sensitive areas such as ideology, extremism of all kinds, resentment and (youth) violence is to be achieved. For this reason, the “full engagement of all populations”, i.e. *voluntary bodies and organisations under association law* (NGOs) – by which is meant bodies positioned between state and society – was unanimously resolved as a goal (Counter Terrorism Strategy

14469/4/05). Furthermore, the EU regards it as very important that cooperation between state and society/NGOs should be based on trust and equality and on a relationship of unbreakable mutual trust. A central concern of the Stockholm Programme is the “mutual trust between authorities and services” and “open, transparent and regular dialogue [with] civil society” (EC Combating Radicalisation 14781/1/05).

- **Comment on the situation in the UK – the TPVR results**

In other words, “community and grass-root organisations” and “social entrepreneurs such as non-profit NGOs”, which are able to operate *model project developments that are adapted to the social environment in a flexible and practical manner*, are recognised by the EU as special relay factors of “societal” deradicalisation. At the same time it is admitted that the member states have hitherto been insufficiently attentive to or appreciative of their NGOs – and that frequently *mistrust, suspicion and rivalry* were in evidence. Thus the final report of the TPVR project stresses that in the early years of cooperation “Muslim community organisation representatives” in the UK often had cause for disappointment with their governmental reference institutions: “They were sometimes frustrated by a lack of trust on the part of offender managers who failed to share information with them or at times to include them in meetings (pertaining to the offender)”. This lack of mutual understanding sometimes went as far as major disruption of the social-therapeutic work: “One community mentor representative described how progress made with a TACT offender (who has been convicted under the UK Terrorism Act) over many weeks could be set back by the insensitive use of risk assessment tools and interventions by (state employed) Offender Managers” (of the national probation services).

C The international conference “Tackling Extremism: Deradicalisation and Disengagement”, Copenhagen 2012¹².

The conference “Tackling Extremism: Deradicalisation and Disengagement” was held on 8-9 May, 2012, organised by the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration in cooperation with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. The conference brought together 90 people from 20 different countries, including government officials, social work and deradicalisation practitioners, representatives from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), researchers and EU representatives.

● The key guiding questions of the conference

What is the potential of direct intervention and mentorship in efforts to assist young people to disengage from extremism?

What is good practice in direct intervention work of deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation?

How do we make sure that the people who work with young people on a daily and local basis have access to the latest knowledge and methods concerning deradicalisation and disengagement?

How do we mobilise the resources of families, communities, social networks, former extremists and the victims of extremist violence in our deradicalisation efforts?

What works and how do we measure it?

● Overview of the main results of the workshops and plenary discussions

Many of the key results of the papers of the international experts do reflect – and powerfully reinforce – the results of the aforementioned evaluation and research results (TPVR, LIPAV, Federal Model Projects). The results as mentioned in the conference report and the actual contributions in the form of papers and workshops given at the conference lead up to the following conclusions.

Good practice approaches to deradicalisation and disengagement “*need to (be) mainstreamed*” and also enter the areas in which practitioners feel deradicalisation is entirely new to them.

The issues of deradicalisation and disengagement have thus far “mainly been addressed from a security angle” and it needs to be acknowledged that “they are also *very much social issues* which have forced a whole range of front line workers to adapt their approach and working methods” in terms of deradicalisation methods.

The “*structures for crime prevention and rehabilitation*” that already exist, should be utilised and built upon, so that efforts to promote disengagement from violence and extremism are not stand-alones.

“Cross sector collaboration between relevant authorities such as police, prison and probation services, social authorities, schools etc.” is necessary. Also further resources such as “*families, communities and people with relevant personal experience* such as former extremists or victims of extremist violence” should be integrated. Thus, essential functions of the work of deradicalisation are taken out of the hands of statutory government employees – who for their own reasons may have trouble in establishing trust and respect-based work relationships anyhow – and assigned to specialised representatives of civil society.

12 <http://ereg.me/ehome/32233/60864/?&>

Government engagement and financial “investment in socially oriented prevention and disengagement programmes” need to be reliable, responsible and long-term. “*Short term funding* arrangements can cause more problems than they solve” since they may result in instability, loss of personnel, know-how and quality management and in the build-up of a counter-productive industry of implementing and effectively spending unreliable government funds.

The logic of short-term, thematically ever changing and ‘innovation-crazy’ government programmes issued by administrations that have only little and abstract knowledge of the methodological challenges at hand and resulting in numerous disjointed projects – in a administrative landscape affected by the proverbial virus of ‘projecto-nitis’ - is counter-productive. It conflicts with what has been recognised as being of paramount importance: that “*strong and trusted personal relationships*” are made possible in deradicalisation and disengagement work.

Since deradicalisation work is essentially relationship-based – just like any other work of personal training and therapy – the “personal character” and interactional style “of a mentor or other *relational workers*” is of crucial importance. While “*perseverance, empathy, enthusiasm*”, the ability to confront and support concomitantly, to keep personal boundaries etc. “are some of the most important personal traits of a good relational worker”, these relational skills can very well be trained in train-the-trainer and on-the-job-supervision settings.

Hence the ability to build trusting relationships and support positive, pro-social change “also *requires tools and skills*”. This includes an “understanding of the different types of risk factors, protective factors, motivational factors and ideological factors” as well as understanding of “the barriers to positive change that apply in each case”. Furthermore, an understanding of how to realise “*specific mentor-mentee matches*” or the fit of a group for group work approaches, would have to be part of such training.

While the emphasis of deradicalisation work is and needs to be relational and thus more narrative-emotional than cognitive-ideological, “relational workers may profit from *skills to deconstruct and challenge the propaganda and rhetoric* of extremist groups, seeking to legitimise violence.”

Here, realism in expectations about the success of one’s work is essential: with young radicalised people “involved in extremism” it is maximal success to have been able to “*sow seeds of doubt, but not try to win arguments*”.

Hence, “a *narrative biographical dialogue* with the person, focusing on issues like family, self perception ...” friends, special biographical experiences, events of denigration and victimization, “*putting emotions into words*”, may be one example of a useful tool which can achieve this.

“Those disengaging from extremism require *practical help* and assistance. ... When a person is presented with new and legitimate opportunities, for instance job opportunities, education” and alternative leisure activities, “providing life experiences and relationships,” this then “might be seen as an attractive alternative” to criminal or extremist behaviour.

Young people “disengaging from extremism benefit from support from a rich and varied *network of people and organizations*. ... *families and communities* can be part of the solution, or they can be part of the problem.” Some families and other social networks represent protective factors like resourcefulness and close and positive relations to the person in question. Other families and networks may well represent risk factors in the form of poor resources and relations or even direct negative, ideological influence.

“An important perspective for the future is to build and expand new types of networks and partnerships, connecting all these actors, and building *bridges across distinctions* such as local, national and international, civil and public, *professional and volunteer*, East and West ...”

Any public discourse on radicalism issues in mainstream or off-stream media is of key importance. Furthermore, “the role of the *Internet and social media* should not be underestimated”. “The fact that extremists are recruiting and *radicalising online* raises challenges for those working to counter violent extremism. It is vital that governments and communities are active online, challenging these narratives and understanding how to use social media effectively.”

“We need to adapt our *monitoring and measurement* methods in regard to deradicalisation and disengagement initiatives. ... It is difficult to measure and document what works. A monitoring approach that sheds light on the mechanisms that lead to a good result, rather than a mere quantitative focus on end-effect, may be the answer.”

Observing the principles of “*open process*” and “process-oriented work” which does not follow a fixed syllabus but “negotiates with the clients” is key for this work. While “methods and preventive models are not irrelevant ... one should *not rely on one specific model*, but adapt work methods to the particular circumstances of the persons and problems at hand.”

“In this respect, it is vitally important to *share experiences* and good practices across national boundaries” in order to “enhance the knowledge building process.”

D The German Federal Criminal Police Office's (BKA) research project on violent extremists and terrorists from different countries and different ideological backgrounds (Saskia Lützinger)¹³

The Lützinger study was carried out in the context of the research department of the German Federal Criminal Police Office' (BKA) which has existed in this form since the German presidency of the EU Council (2007). It was published in German in 2010.

The study is going to be translated into English at some point soon. The following excerpts are drawn from an unpublished English summary by the author, Saskia Lützinger:

D.1 Commonalities in biography and psycho-social patterns of extremists/terrorists from different milieus

"The study ... compared the biographies of 39 individuals who can be assigned to the extreme left- and right-wing and the Islamist scene. Our profound qualitative analysis of the extensive biographical data collected by the narrative interview method highlighted some distinctive features that will be trenchantly presented further down below. By and large and in accordance with the working hypothesis of the research project we realised that the interviewees, *despite their different orientations, shared a great number of commonalities*. Viewed from a more abstract angle and leaving aside concrete ideological contents it became clear that the ideologies and in particular the groups embracing them offer the individuals concerned a sense of support and orientation in their everyday lives. So it is small wonder that the *biographical histories* of our subjects presented *identical basic psycho-social patterns* of development, regardless of their endorsement of or affiliation to the respective ideologies or extremist groups."

Dysfunctional parenting – unstable familial conditions and tremendous stress – overlap and multiplication of intra- and extra-familial conflicts

"Our most striking finding was that - regardless of their ideological orientation or whether or not they had committed offences associated with or motivated by any ideology - all interviewees had suffered from *unstable familial conditions* and *tremendous stress* throughout their development. As the *coping strategies* adopted by their families were *usually dysfunctional*, the interviewees had no choice but to fend for themselves most of the time, resorting largely to individually created solutions and coping strategies."

Lack of warmth and security at home – joining alternative social groups

"The interviewees later on employed in their social environment the *dysfunctional strategies* they had been taught by or copied from their families, thus often generating new conflicts like problems at school or social marginalisation. As their families, who were under much strain in the first place, were (mostly) unable to deal with their problems, the *interplay between intra- and extra-familial conflicts* frequently culminated in their (emotionally) withdrawing or separating from their family. For this reason, all interviewees attached particular importance to *joining alternative social groups* (mainly *peer groups*, outside of school) that matched their individual needs and coping patterns. Thanks to a *lack of warmth and security at home* and a concomitant sense of disorientation, the only social support the interviewees could find was within their inner clique. If nothing else, this turned out to be the *root cause* behind their susceptibility to group dynamics and the extremely close ties with their clique. From a functional point of view these cliques frequently doubled as surrogate families, as is reflected also in their common parlance: The interviewees generally *called their clique their 'family'*".

13 Lützinger, Saskia (2010). Die Sicht der Anderen. Eine qualitative Studie zu Biographien von Extremisten und Terroristen. Mit Beiträgen von B. Kraus, C. Mathes, T. Schweer. Köln: Luchterhand. Soon to be published in English: "The other side of the story: a qualitative study of biographies for extremists and terrorists"

Familial circumstances ...resembled those of other delinquent adolescents

"The (new) social identity – e. g. as *skinhead* or *jihadist* – that the interviewees assumed in their cliques quickly relegated their personal identity, including their problems, to the background, which proved favourable for the radicalisation process within or with the group. Even though the interviewees' familial circumstances differed drastically in nature compared to those of the average population, they did not inevitably produce the specific conditions leading up to terrorism or extremism. Rather, the familial constellations that we identified closely *resembled those of other delinquent adolescents* who in spite of their situation do not go into terrorist or extremist milieus (cf. Göppinger 1997, 464; Stelly/Thomas 2005, 257 et seq.)."

"The same is true for the interviewees' *perforated educational and sporadic employment careers* (cf. Göppinger 1997, 459 et seq.). We deem it noteworthy that compared to the right and left wing oriented individuals, the Islamists in general succeeded considerably more often in completing school and advancing professionally, which is probably due to a need to compensate their perceived downward social movement in association with their immigrant background."

Establish power relationships, manifest 'masculinity' and denigrate others

"Across the board, we noticed a general inclination among the interviewees to associate violence with the *establishment of power relationships* and the manifestation of *their masculinity*, going hand in hand *with denigrating others* as e. g. "infidels" or "lazy bums". As for the interviewees' attitudes toward and judgment of acts of violence or offences which they themselves had committed, they employed a highly flexible system of standards. While they principally denounced and rejected violence exerted by others like, for instance, terrorist attacks or the use of violence by their parents, they tended to *vindicate or trivialise their own acts of violence* by somehow neutralising them (cf. in this context 'Neutralisationstechniken' according to Sykes/Matza 1957). The detainees in particular had a distinctly warped perception of the degree of severity of violence, especially regarding violent acts which they themselves had committed."

Violence, alcohol and drugs – already as intra-familial coping strategies

"In addition to the use of *violence, alcohol and drug consumption* were the most frequently pursued dysfunctional, *intra-familial coping* strategies that were usually continued outside the family milieu within the groups joined later on. While all study group subjects had, in equal measure, consumed and dealt in illicit drugs, we found major differences in alcohol consumption, the left-wing and right-wing oriented interviewees frequently reporting (excessive) alcohol consumption, in contrast to the Islamists who made a point of being abstinent. It was this abstinence that had often sparked off conflicts with their peers, which the interviewees interpreted as religious discrimination."

"In addition to the above-mentioned biographical and socialisation aspects, *violence* and *drugs* were the topics most frequently mentioned and most intensely discussed by the interviewees. In keeping with the classical theories of learning (e. g. Sutherland 1968), the interviewees learned through contact with other group members how a specific group behaved and what attitude it had toward the exertion of violence as well as toward drug and alcohol consumption, constant contact reinforcing these attitudes throughout the group (cf. Burgess/Akers 1966)."

Desire for order and predefined structures

"The group's clearly defined rules on attitude, behaviour and identity concepts represented palpable guidance for the interviewees and exerted a strong attraction to them, which can be explained by the *desire for order and predefined structures* that so many of them had expressed. On top of this, these groups - as is typical of adolescent scene/cliques - offered the individuals an opportunity to make up for their

own subjectively perceived shortcomings by e.g. wearing clothes typically worn by that scene and/or behaving accordingly, a phenomenon Gollwitzer/Wicklund described by the term or theoretical concept of 'Symbolic Self-Completion' (cf. Gollwitzer/Wicklund 1985, 62 et seq.)"

Thrill-seeking, attention-seeking – adventure and risk-taking

"Talking about their journey to radicalisation, the interviewees mentioned personal in addition to environmental aspects, revealing a strong *penchant for adventure and risk-taking* and a distinct proclivity for self-fashioning. Some interviewees described how they drew attention to themselves by *acts of denial or aggressive behaviour*, for example, or by putting on humorous or "macho" allures (*class clown*), thus moving themselves into the focus of interest in different spheres of life. This compensatory behaviour, which was perceived by those around them as problematical and against the rules, was usually fully accepted within their clique. This is not surprising if we consider that we are talking about the link-ups of primarily young people with similar experiences and social deficits."

Getting accustomed to the extremists' role models which happen to be around in the every-day social sphere

"Most interviewees began to study the habitus of the relevant scene before joining it as their social milieu or peer group had already set typical examples and confronted them with representatives of the scene (e. g. on the way to school, at school, in social or religious clubs and associations, in the media). Mostly this process was not triggered by a singular special key event but *evolved over a prolonged period* of time."

Lower secondary school, lower social strata, problem families –

"Our study illustrates that *lower secondary school* in particular seems to be "pooling the children from the *lower social strata*, from *problem families* and especially from immigrant and foreign families" (Hurrelmann 1991) and thus is a particularly conflict-laden social hot spot characterised by a diverse range of *simple-minded, highly polarizing attitudes* and behavioural patterns based on stereotypes revolving around *enhanced self-worth and the simultaneous denigration of others* (who are different, e. g. foreigners, Turks, antisocial elements, Nazis). As usual, this is accompanied by a strong perception of *out-group homogeneity* (cf. Aronson et al. 2004, 493)."

Phase of loneliness and disorientation – a chain of unsuspicious biographical events

"As a general rule, the interviewees linked up with a clique or scene representative (joining the scene) on a long-term basis during a *phase in their lives that they described as one of loneliness and disorientation*. This phase could not always be attributed to concrete (critical) milestone events in the individuals' biographies, but more often was incurred by *psychological processes and emotions* triggered by several incidents (*chain of events*) that did not necessarily seem to be of an inherently critical nature when watched from the sidelines. An analytical reconstruction and portrayal of these development processes is impossible without resorting to the interviewees' subjective interpretations and perceptions. For example, moving to another town was interpreted as something positive by one individual to whom this meant a new beginning, whereas another one experienced the same thing as a negative interruption of his life because it entailed the loss of his friends."

The offer of prefabricated interpretation and reasoning patterns – and the factor of global political events

"The original clique had a very special function in that it offered the individuals *prefabricated interpretation and reasoning patterns* which helped them to structure and perfectly sum up their own, still chaotic, attitudes and emotions ("catalytic" function). Their attitudes toward alcohol, drugs and violence as well as their capability to subordinate and control themselves played a major role for their integration into

and further career within the scene. Extremely violent interviewees, for instance, did not remain party members for very long, and those persons whose alcohol consumption did not chime with the *party culture* mindset rather kept their distance from skinhead groups. Next to these personal factors, intra-scene occurrences (frequently also myths about the scene) and *global political events* also determined the way the individuals and/or a clique or group developed."

Ideology is secondary

"The interviewees' interest in the scene or its representatives was based *not necessarily on ideology* but mainly on the scene members' appearance, dress codes and the respective image of the scene, clique or person. Beyond this, it sometimes happened that several members of a previously low-profile clique became radicalised, which invariably entailed a restructuring of the group (split-up due to individual members' termination of relationship to the group)."

Targeted recruiting matters

"In addition to *purposeful recruiting* (passive joining) we also observed that individuals were actively pushed to join by e. g. deliberately approaching a person that looked promising. According to our data, the *deliberate approach* is the most frequently described kind of making contact."

Choice of the particular extremism is mostly accidental – within the closer social environment – yet political attitudes then get internalised over time

"In summary, we can state that (orientation) *models within the closer social environment* of an individual were of paramount importance (cf. also Bandura 1976 in this context) and that the decision in favour of a certain extremist milieu is *determined by accident* and – along the lines of supply and demand – the availability of such models. *Religion* and *politics* were of rather secondary importance typically increasing in the course of adolescence and frequently only in conjunction with the scene, if at all. When joining the respective scene, the individuals usually did not properly analyze the political aspects, their main *focus being on social and emotional* points of reference. The individuals' chief motive for joining extreme (extremist) cliques was their search for social support, understanding and order, with the exception of those interviewees who socialised into the respective scenes only after they had completed their 28th year of age and who by all means displayed clearly defined (political) concepts or intentions when they made contact with the respective milieus. Accordingly, adolescents and young adults seemed to join *rather for emotional and adventure-seeking than political motives*, yet over time assumed patterns of politically associated lines of reasoning and legitimisation."

"The *Islamist interviewees*, too, displayed political rather than religious patterns of reasoning, but we must remember in this context that many Muslims see religion and politics as closely intertwined and difficult to separate from one another. While the six interviewees of our study do not constitute an extensive body of data on the Islamist scene, our findings nevertheless raise the question, "To what extent are Islamist players driven by political more than religious motives?". While it is true that they set high store by religion if they want to create a feeling of belonging and justify their behaviour, their prime objectives are political in nature, like e. g. changing global politics and promoting their own lifestyle (based on their religion) around the globe. "

Transition from extremist to terrorist is mostly accidentally and unpredictable

"Contrary to what we had expected, the transition from being an extremist willing to commit a crime to becoming a terrorist was an *unplanned and unpredictable process*, driven mainly by group-dynamics (e. g. a kind of competition culture within the group or distinct role constraints) or *unpredictable events* (*accidentally* obtaining explosives, meeting war-damaged persons from the Gaza strip, intra-scene events). As for the terrorists, we noticed that a potentially critical personal situation, their joining the

scene and their identification with the scene's ideology all happened *within a brief period of time*, which indicates a more dynamic radicalisation process; however, members of these extremist-terrorist scenes committed actual offences only after a certain time span had elapsed. Procuring or producing explosives was not planned in advance but mainly happened accidentally, taking the form of a "self-fulfilling prophecy" with a lot of media coverage, for example: two individuals reported having obtained explosives thanks to favourable contingencies, with no concrete prior plans or intentions; in a third case, *media coverage*, presenting the interviewee and his collaborator as well-versed professionals, resulted in their preparing previously "*poorly organised activities*" "*more professionally*" later on, with the consequence that they started to deliberately set their minds on finding ways to procure explosives, and eventually successfully so. Moreover, we noted that *participating in planning an attack was not necessarily tantamount to approving* of it. The individuals frequently refrained from leaving the group because of their personal ties with another group member/ other group members, *group loyalty* and the *social pressure* exerted by the group."

Prior criminal record before becoming radicalised

"Many interviewees had committed offences even before joining the scene, with general criminal offences far outweighing the number of those perpetrated for *political motives*. Moreover, not all offences at first glance seemingly associated with political motives had actually been committed for ideological reasons."

People willing to disengage first of all want to change their personal situation – not so much their ideology and their friends and social context

"Those interviewees who did mention their intentions to terminate their relationship to the group and took concrete steps to this end did not always simultaneously renounce the ideology and withdraw from the social scene-related setting. They frequently continued to *maintain contact even after their "abandoning" of the ideology*. This observation indicates the *important social role* the groups played - in comparison to ideology – which also showed during the process of joining."

D.2 Key results of the Lützing study – context and push factors of violent radicalization

Hence, the Lützing study about the base personality traits and biographical issues of violent/ extremists and terrorists clearly defines the conditions and challenges that successful deradicalisation interventions have to take account of – and need to find solutions and answers for.

• Biography and social context

The people interviewed share identical biographical and psycho-social patterns – across the board of all different sorts of violent extremism.

Hence, there seems to be one identical base-grammar according to which violent extremisms function in psycho-social respects. Also there seems to be one base set of societal circumstances and biographical factors which generate violent extremists – of whichever kind.

The interviewees share experiences of dysfunctional parenting, unstable familial conditions and a substantial degree of relational stress– generally: a lack of warmth and security at home. Therefore they join alternative social groups as 'surrogate families' and become highly dependent on them.

Violence, alcohol and drugs as dysfunctional coping strategies have already been in place in the family.

Violent extremists overwhelmingly come from lower social strata, from 'problem families' and have low levels of education.

Violent extremists resembled, in their familial circumstances, other delinquent adolescents – and often have a prior criminal record before becoming radicalised.

Radicalization typically sets in during a phase of loneliness and disorientation. Yet, it is most often the result of a chain of – unsuspecting – biographical events which in and of themselves do not appear troublesome.

Personally targeted recruiting measures were highly effective with the interviewees.

- **Ideology and style of thinking and acting**

Ideology is absolutely secondary and often accidental in the radicalization process. Yet, once internalised over time, ideological issues need to be part of deradicalisation interventions to some extent.

Generally the people involved tend to rely on prefabricated and simplified interpretation and reasoning patterns – both in their personal and in the political world.

The choice of a particular extremism is mostly accidental – and often seems interchangeable. Even the transition from being extremist to becoming a terrorist is mostly accidentally and unpredictable.

Instead, the young people slowly got accustomed to the extremists' role models which are readily available in their everyday social sphere.

The interviewees often witness the effects of an overlap/ multiplication of intra- and extra-familial conflicts – which pertains to national or/and international and geo-political conflicts.

All of the interviewees tend to establish power relationships, have an ambition to manifest 'masculinity' and vehemently denigrate others.

E. 'Jacky' – case study of a young neo-Nazi woman in Germany. Michaela Köttig's biographical research on the life-history, ideology, and psychological make-up of violent right-wing extremists in Germany¹⁴

The following case study is provided by Michaela Köttig's extensive monographic study. It offers a good insight into the dimensions of personal-biographical development, that a methodological approach involving "subject orientation, relation to the lifeworld [of participants], and conflict sensitivity" – as well as the other above mentioned impact factors – can touch on and open up. 'Jacky' represents a particularly striking example, which will be looked at in more detail here, in order to include input from the latest *qualitative process- and praxis- research* in the field of right-wing extremism prevention. This case is perhaps all the more revealing for the fact that Köttig did not choose the purported main problem group – young men – as the object of her research, but instead looked at girls and young women from the far-right, violent scene; for this reason alone she had no choice but to proceed entirely without predisposition and with flexibility in her methodology. This revealed once again, and particularly strikingly, the extent to which process- and relationship-based work centred on the participant's lifeworld – which inevitably includes biographical (self-) investigation – is essential for successful prevention and reintegration.

It is certainly no coincidence that Köttig, in her critical appraisal of current social-educational practice, starts from the position of a research methodology that itself is consistently subject oriented, addresses participants' lifeworld, and is conflict-sensitive and relationship-based. Köttig's observation that the "accepting" and "confrontational" approaches, in their respective "unidirectional" focuses, fail to recognise "the complex cause-effect relationships involved in far-right orientations", but could potentially present considerable educational potential, is, after all, essentially thanks to her *biographical-scientific perspective*. It has become increasingly clear – for example from experiences at VPN – how strongly these far-right "cause-effect relationships" are determined by "*biographical processes and family past*" and for this reason, socio-therapeutic work needs to take a differentiated approach that goes beyond mere acceptance of the person or emphatic confrontation with their political views.

It has furthermore emerged that the main tool used in this area of research – open, biographical-narrative interviews and case analyses involving the reconstruction of the participant's life history – is not only a useful means of qualitative data acquisition, but also always has *quasi-therapeutic effects*. The field of biographical research itself only recognised – or was prepared to concede the existence of – this relationship at a relatively late stage. (It was possibly the anti-psychological mindset in social science and social work as referred to above that rendered the socio-therapeutic potential of biography work less clearly apparent.) In her 2002 essay, Gabriele Rosenthal expressly acknowledged the relevance of "narrative with therapeutic effect in a research and counselling context" for biographical research specifically, and

14 The following chapter is quoted from the yet unpublished monograph: Harald Weilnböck (2010): "The 'Violence Prevention Network'-Approach – Group Work, Civic Education and Social-/Cultural Work with Young Violent Extremist Offenders", in part realised in the context of the EU-project: Towards Preventing Violent Radicalisation` (TPVR) by London Probation and VPN in 2010. The case story material discussed here had been quoted in German from Michaela Köttig's (2004) not yet translated monograph: "Lebensgeschichten rechtsextrem orientierter Mädchen und junger Frauen – Biographische Verläufe im Kontext der Familien- und Gruppendynamik. Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag. For further methodological input see Köttig, M. (2008). Der biographische Ansatz in der Einzelfallhilfe mit rechtsextrem orientierten Mädchen und jungen Frauen. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research [On-line Journal], 9(2) Januar 2008. Available at: <http://qualitative-research.net> und http://www.soziologie.uni-kiel.de/bergermethqual/Kottig_Der_biographische_Ansatz_2008.pdf.

Köttig's study – primarily by making authoritative use of resources from psychological psychotraumatology – began systematically to develop it.¹⁵

It is the incorporation of the *therapeutic consciousness* into biographical methodology that is significant for our study, because after all the VPN method intuitively emphasised biographical work, if only in order to establish sufficient trust in group and individual work. One promising approach is to consider Köttig's *case analysis*, in which the object of the study intensified her "contact with the far-right scene" "during the very phase" in which they were addressed in an accepting-assistive manner. It should be mentioned straight away that the disengagement process was connected to a not inconsiderable extent with the biographical reflection process involved in the study (which included several personal interviews over the course of two years, and interviews with the young woman's brother).

E.1 'Jacky' 1: Three-generationally transmitted family patterns of violent and abusive relationships

"Born in 1978 in a West German town", Jacky grew up together with a brother four years older than her in a family environment in which she was confronted "with the violence" of her alcoholic father "right from her early childhood". Jacky experienced her mother as supportive, but that relationship was overshadowed by the presence of her unpredictable father. Furthermore, the mother died from cancer "after a long period in hospital" when Jacky was 12. A year later, her 17 year-old brother left home, as a result of which Jacky was exposed "for a further three years to the misdeeds of her father, which clearly reflected a complete abuse of power: for example in the form of control over Jacky's diet and sleep, brutal physical attacks," and increasingly also "sexualised assaults". As is generally the case in constellations of this kind, the victim experienced extremely powerful ambivalences in her relationship to the parent in question, the like of which can make the necessary abstinence enormously more difficult. For example, Jacky expressly emphasises that, "When my father was sober, I had the nicest childhood ever [...] going for walks, artwork, doing nice things".

The wider family framework also appears to have been so unstable that, when Jacky's mother died, Jacky's contact with relatives on her maternal and paternal side was severed (for reasons that could not be established by that time) and Jacky was left entirely on her own. Both sets of grandparents appear, each in their own way, to have been strongly affected by the War and by addictions to alcohol and tablets, and co-dependency with their respective partners. Jacky's father's family, who live in Austria, additionally appear to have had a certain, but ultimately difficult to pinpoint, connection to National Socialism, and in any case appear to have been more severely psychosocially impaired, because incestuous assaults clearly took place between Jacky's father and his sisters. Jacky's family on her mother's side had a strong presence in the region, and some may have had a Sinti background: "My grandmother used to go around with gypsies [...] so I don't have any real uncles or aunts (on my mother's side); they were more like foster children for her (...). She lived together with them". It was not possible to verify whether this was all true or whether it was a myth created by Jacky and her family. In any case Jacky appears to have perceived this grandmother – for whatever reasons – as not being significantly close to her, and even today she continues to be reserved in this regard.

"Jacky's childhood and early adolescence were thus characterised by violence, a lack of protection, and experiences of loss" which certainly resulted in a wide range of "destabilisations", "considerable stress" and various "trauma-compensating" modes of behaviour. It can be said that, during her adolescent years, Jacky was forced by her "threatening life situation to disassociate feelings of grief, loss and injury". This certainly took place to a significant extent on a psychosomatic level, because Jacky

¹⁵ Strikingly, however, even the 2008 essay cited here does not refer at all to the attributes "unconscious" and "mental", so important to a contemporary theory of effective preventive work; the attribute "not conscious" is however referred to on one occasion, and the narratological terms "subject avoidance" and "dissociation" on several.

was responding by developing bulimia and losing a great deal of weight. Through her relationship with a young man from the far-right scene and by taking up sports, judo and kickboxing training, she was able to increasingly distance herself from her father. At the age of 16, she finally left the flat following a number of assaults, fights and police interventions, which have not yet been satisfactorily understood.

E.2 'Jacky'2: The unconscious acting-out of biographical issues in the extremist peer-group

In her "contact with the far-right scene", Jacky first of all recreated her early experiences of "alcohol consumption and violence", "but this time with the difference that the violence was not directed against her". On the contrary, her association with the scene allowed her "to act out her own aggression", because in that environment "violence against other people" is tolerated and valued. Jacky herself provoked "violent conflicts both within and outside the scene" on several occasions. She became involved in situations in which she only barely maintained control over herself, and "struck out in a knee-jerk manner". It is more due to chance or the inability of law enforcement authorities to reliably identify girls and women as perpetrators of violent acts that Jacky did not have to attend any court proceedings – and consequently did not fall within the spectrum of individuals considered suitable for VPN group training courses (far-right male prison inmates).

When Jacky turned towards the far-right youth scene, *processing and coping* mechanisms – the importance of which should not be underestimated – were also at work. Here she was clearly able to "compensate for" the violence and powerlessness that she experienced in her family, and achieve a situation in which she could "distance herself from the maltreatment she had suffered" – and also make her father's behaviour subjectively more "explainable" and "controllable". On the one hand Jacky "increasingly learned possible forms of action (to enable her) to assert herself against her partners and achieve a situation in which the potential for violence was not directed at her". And on the other hand, "again and again she entered into conflicts with members of the far-right scene – for example about their alcohol consumption," which she saw as a significant cause of her comrades' "self-inflicted unemployment". So when the study states "that, within the far right-leaning clique, Jacky waged conflicts vicariously" that originated from experiences in her life history with her father and her family, these also include elements of constructive processing.

Then again, however, this "vicarious self-processing" resulted in a profound "*avoidance of the subject* of the real relationship with her father" and a *disassociation* of her memories from her life history, which must furthermore have created considerable difficulties for her in living her life. Not only did Jacky completely "sever contact" with her father and was unaware of the connections between the history of her father-daughter relationship and her current social environment in the far-right clique; she also repeatedly found herself in romantic relationships with violent young men with a tendency to alcoholism. This must have created considerable difficulties in her life and personal development, even if she was able to avoid falling victim to this violence. Clearly, *biographical awareness* and *biographical self-empathy* – the central impact factors in biographical work according to the VPN method – were initially largely inactive for Jacky; instead, a precarious *repetition and projection dynamic* was at work.

This *repetition and projection dynamic* was also apparent in a "*political argument* of the far-right scene" which Jacky herself held and expressed in an "exaggerated" manner: namely the idea that "foreign men are [the main perpetrators of the more] serious sexualised assaults on German women". In the detailed analyses of the relevant transcript sequences and through comparison of various interviews (including those with Jacky's brother), it became evident that, when talking about "foreigners", Jacky was again unconsciously processing her experiences of her father's sexualised assaults, which she had largely mentally dissociated and was unable to include directly in her own account in the interviews. Instead, during both interviews, she

appears to experience an “ambivalence between ‘not being able to say’ and ‘wanting to say’”, which can be detected in the transcript in the form of “repeated attempts to draw closer to the experience, or to the topic that had been avoided” – attempts from which Jacky, as the narrator, “shies away from on each occasion”. Here the general mechanism of *unconscious projection* of troubling – and therefore mentally dissociated – experiences onto an external projection figure (the “foreigner”) appear in Jacky’s case to be further reinforced by the fact that she also perceived her father – an Austrian – as a foreigner. Paradoxically, however, what she does not do is become aware of his assaults against her and their consequences, or express these as the narrator of her own story.

E.3 ‘Jacky’ 3: Dissociated memories and unconscious projections onto a foe image – and the resolving potential of narrative work

Jacky’s adoption of the far right’s condemnation of foreigners and foreign men must be seen to a very large extent as a form of *unconscious projection* that allows her to bury and deny personal traumatic experiences, fraught with deep ambivalences. In addition to the element of denial, it also serves a function of aggressive self-empowerment, by permitting an unconscious “reversal of the power relationship between herself and her father”. Because although Jacky “experienced her father – both as a parent and a man – as destructive and powerful”, according to right-wing ideology he – the “foreigner” – was inferior, and she – the German – superior. All in all, this highly projective behaviour prevented Jacky from more intensively addressing her “real relationship with her father” and starting to relive the affects of “helplessness”, “grief” and “loss” from which she had suffered but which she had necessarily dissociated. Naturally it hindered Jacky – as a young, increasingly independent citizen – in forming an appropriate, emotionally moderated picture of the politico-social situation in her country and local area.

Jacky’s “foreigner” argument alone provides a fairly clear indication as to why *confrontational intervention* as understood by traditional civic education – which deals primarily with facts, cognitive information and discussion of prejudices against foreigners – is hardly like to be effective in Jacky’s case, or certainly not until at least a modicum of mutual trust has been established, and a willingness to recall, voluntarily narrate and reflect on experiences from her own life history. This is because it is hardly possible to reach on a purely factual level what Jacky is actually referring to when she speaks of “foreigners”.

On the other hand, however, the purely *accepting approach* is equally unpromising, as Jacky’s story so clearly shows. When Jacky was eventually “housed in a residential community for girls, finished secondary school and started an apprenticeship”, her contact with far-right activities actually intensified. Jacky “now approached a (far-right) group independently of her boyfriend, and started to take an interest in the political ideology” (of the scene). The “ostensible solution to her problem” thus “admittedly (resulted in) a relaxation at the social level (and) to her finishing school and starting an apprenticeship”. However it did not lessen her ideological commitment to the far right. This was because her commitment was fed by a unconscious *psychodynamic tension* based on – split-off – experiences of violence and trauma from her life history and family biography, which was not assuaged by supporting her social integration or job situation.

Jacky’s “self-positioning in the far-right scene, and her exaggerated arguments” are indeed imperceptibly rooted in many instances in her “overall life history”. To solve the problem of this psychodynamic tension and the extremist behaviour connected with it, sound *social-therapeutic experience* that incorporated, among other things, biographical-reflective work (certainly including elements of both the accepting and confrontational approaches, naturally complementing one another) was needed. Only through approaches like the one delivered by VPN could Jacky have actualised, felt, and learned to cope with the pain inflicted on her. This, in turn, would have created

the indispensable conditions for the gradual regression of her symptoms – i.e. her psychosomatic symptoms and violent behaviour, but also her extremist thought patterns.

E.4 'Jacky' 4: Projecting fantasy history and family fantasy histories out of personal dilemmas – and the limits of confrontational intervention

In the absence of such experience, Jacky was “forced to find her own method of processing” – which in Jacky’s case was based on prejudice affects and projection-laden cognitive constructs incorporating allegorical and *ideologically-bound personal fantasies*. Other ideological concepts demonstrate this even more clearly than Jacky’s (relatively conventional) prejudice about “foreign men”: For example, as Jacky increasingly immersed herself in the ideology of the far right, she developed views regarding “whether, and if so at what degree, Hitler should have ended his aggressions and stopped expanding his power”, in order to ensure the long-term success of his politics and social ideas. Here, as in the prejudice about the “aggressive foreigner”, the impulse (prompted by personal-biographical circumstances) to “defuse” or “de-dramatise” an excessively powerful *male aggressor figure* was at work. This certainly always involved at least an implicit playing-down or denial of the aggression that she experienced from her father – analogous to the aggression that took place historically in the Third Reich. Such cognitive impulses were highly unlikely to relieve the psycho-traumatic problems linked to Jacky’s relationship with her father (just as they certainly do not bring about any socially or ethically sustainable political strategy).

In another projective, fantastical and ideologically-coloured cognitive construct, Jacky did address the subject of her own family – but only in terms of her grandparents, about whom she had very little reliable information. One specific fantasy concerned the role of one of her grandfathers in the Third Reich: according to Jacky, her paternal grandfather was a National Socialist and a member of the SS, but “his activities” were entirely “non-violent” in nature. Jacky’s parents and relatives never spoke about how or to what extent this grandfather was involved in National Socialism, and the results of research in the Federal archive were negative. Nonetheless, Jacky said she remembered how “there were photos of him everywhere in my grandparents’ flat [...] at events [...] in big halls, and in uniform”, which her grandmother “proudly displayed”. This vague memory was enough to prompt Jacky to develop her entirely personal ideas about her “important” but “non-violent” SS grandfather.

Like in her deliberations as to when Hitler should have stopped, here Jacky again realised a further possibility for unconsciously *using her imagination to turn evil* (that she herself has experienced, but largely dissociated) *into good*, or at least to mitigate it, in the context of German violent history. Yet again, however, the violence that she specifically experienced in her family (and that must have been operative mostly in her father’s Austrian side of the family in terms of sexual abuse at least) – which can quite reasonably be considered the cause of these fantasies – remained excluded from conscious acknowledgement. Thus this idea once again allowed “threatening feelings such as grief, loss, helplessness and pain” – which she must have been exposed to “upon the death of her mother” and through the violence and destructiveness of her father – “to be further dissociated” and covered up by a fantasy about an “important” but “non-violent” SS grandfather. Jacky’s extensive mental “examinations” thus inevitably had to remain “incomplete”, because they addressed “neither the misdeeds of her father nor the violent crimes of Hitler” to any sufficient extent.

E.5 The shortcomings of informational, educational or behaviouristic training approaches – in the face of the psycho-biographical complexities of extremists

Once again, it is clear that what is presented here, dressed in political extremist ideology, is in fact essentially a highly *idiosyncratic and projective means* by which Jacky – in a veiled and entirely involuntary manner – processed traumatic burdens

from her own biography and family history. This would appear to support Köttig's statement that, "were Jacky confronted – in the manner favoured by 'confrontational' approaches – with her political statements" or were she addressed in an informational or behaviouristic training approach, this would hardly be likely to prove effective. Such an approach would involve, for example, explaining to Jacky in a cognitive-rational and fact-based manner that "'foreign men' do not perpetrate sexual assaults either more or less frequently" than German men, or that being a member of the SS or indeed adhering to National Socialism at all may indeed have involved a range of degrees of forms of violence, but certainly did not involve a "non-violent" lifestyle.

For individuals such as Jacky, so deeply affected by dissociated, psycho-traumatically linked prejudices and "trauma-compensating" modes of extremist thinking and behaviour – as basically all extremists are – experience has shown that pedagogical approaches of a confrontational, informational, educational and/or behavioural kind are entirely fruitless – and methodologically misplaced. Because of her unconscious method of processing her past "by substitution", it is very likely that Jacky would have come to the conclusion, at an emotional level, that "they don't believe me", or, in a more psychodynamic respect, that "the assaults by her father never really took place". This would have destroyed the foundation of trust, so indispensable for any kind of educational dialogue. The psychodynamic distrust reflex is triggered and the relationship breaks off particularly inevitably in constellations of this kind because such assaults within families are always surrounded by potent ambivalences towards the respective parent ("When my father was sober, I had the nicest childhood ever [...] going for walks, artwork, doing nice things"). Thus, to some extent, even Jacky herself did not quite believe in the existence of the assaults (at least insofar as she plays down their gravity and is unaware of the extent of the betrayal of trust involved, and of the personal trauma that they have caused her).

Under conditions such as these, it is thus particularly indispensable to see far-right statements of this kind as "important" personal messages, to take "a questioning, curiously investigative attitude" to them, and to avoid "all stigmatisation" of them as morally objectionable or unspeakable. If a trusting relationship of this kind cannot be established, then everything taking place after the breakdown of trust would "probably lead to Jacky [developing] even more subtle mechanisms" in order "to distance herself from her father and his violence" through her involvement in the far-right scene. In Jacky's case it would have made more sense – again to quote Köttig – "within a safe environment, to engage with her life history, and the awful cumulative experiences that took place during that time, and thereby to enable her to tap into not only her own history, but also her family history", right from the time of her joining the girls' residential group. In other words, the only way to achieve the desired results is through trust-based, relationship-based approaches involving an investigation of the participant's *personal experience* in the context of their *personal life history and family biography*.

Given the often *anti-psychological* nature of the discourse in traditional civic education – or the *anti-psychodynamic* nature of the discourse in behavioural training – the following may not be immediately clear: but Jacky's very long "membership of the far-right scene is primarily due to the fact that she is not able to process her traumatic experiences of her father directly – for example in a safe therapeutic environment – but instead deals with her experience by substitution through the right-wing scene and its ideology" – and consequently an alternative, differentiated approach is needed. This was true also for participants in the VPN group method, the vast majority of whom have similarly destructive or neglectful family backgrounds, and whose extremist thinking and/or violent actions are likewise unconscious attempts to deal with their experiences. They, too, are caught in a paradoxical repetitive pattern in which they attempt to turn their biographical experiences – in a chaotic, idiosyncratic way – into something *somehow subjectively positive*, but which always serves only to perpetuate the spiral of violence and the damage to society.

In social-therapeutic work with Jacky, with prison inmates in VPN group training, and with any other young people with similar psycho-biographical backgrounds who have turned to a violent, extremist lifestyle, the following (which the ministry's final report also expressly indicated) should again be highlighted: that a process involving "subject orientation, relation to the lifeworld [of participants], and conflict sensitivity" – which considers participants' biographical development – is necessary. This is already the case if one "only" "encourages narrative" in a personally interested way, which, as Köttig determines, in itself constitutes a form of "gentle intervention". After all, "encouraging narrative" about participants' experiences from their life history in a way that shows personal interest and curiosity can "motivate clients to submit to processes of remembering" and enable them to come "into contact with their experiences", which are normally "pushed to the rear" "by their impressions of the present", including the everyday events of their extreme/extremist lifestyles. This is enough to trigger "processes of self-understanding" which are a direct result of the "flow of memories (of) thoughts, images, experiences", and which by narrative means allow participants to "reinterpret" their life path and reassess their ideological views. The task that lies ahead is thus to supply a framework in which this can take place, in other words first and foremost to establish a sufficiently strong subject orientation and personal narrative element.

Köttig, too, perceives something that was above determined in relation to the institutional context of social-therapeutic work, and in particular in relation to training for the employees of the respective institutions : the fact that not only the clients, but also the educators can – and must – benefit from subject-oriented, narrative approaches. "Initiating conversations that encourage Jacky to tell her life story" could also enable the "responsible social workers" to better understand clients' "biographical development" and their "social lifeworld" and, on this basis, adopt an effective, development-promoting attitude in working with them – which would certainly no longer be "accepting" or "confrontational"/"moralising" in the narrow sense.

Köttig's work, which has been considered here as representative of the latest qualitative process and praxis research in the field of right-wing extremism prevention, strikingly underlines our findings (and those of quantitative and experimental social psychology in the field of violence and extremism research) namely that taking a process-oriented, relationship-based approach is the only option. Neither training courses that take a cognitive, informational approach with an emphasis on civic education, nor short (behavioural) training courses, can achieve lasting effects, for very basic factual reasons. "Social-psychological [...] studies" have long since shown "that the effective power of prejudices is closely bound to emotions and affects" (expert commentary annual report, Thematic Cluster 3, 2008, 4) and that a person's cumulative biographical experience is highly significant. The content of ideological convictions and their consolidation – and the irrationality with which they are often accompanied – are often largely the result of personal emotional burdens and/or traumas linked to the person's biography, even in the more moderate parts of the ideological spectrum.

E.6 Acknowledging the importance of long-term psychodynamic processes of personal development

It is difficult to deny that any *change in the content of ideological convictions* – and of the elements of a person's identity – must be understood as a long-term dynamic development process. For practical educational purposes, this primarily means not setting oneself excessively high or inappropriate goals. In Jacky's case, much had already been achieved when she began to enter into disputes with her comrades on the far right, became increasingly able to take a step back from her violent behaviour, and started, little by little, to realise the extent to which she tended to recreate powerful burdens from her family of origin in her own adult life. The importance of the fact that she remained linked to the far-right scene and moved within its ideological bounds both during this period and beyond should not be overestimated in relation to the above successes – which came about through interviewing only and through

her own personal development, since Jacky did not have VPN training or anything comparable. Several more years passed before Jacky was able largely to detach herself from her far-right behaviour and thinking, during which time a new family was found for Jacky – that of her significant other, Steffen – and, after overcoming considerable resistance within herself, she allowed herself to become close to it. The fact that her partner, on the other hand, rose to the position of district chairman in a far-right party during this time is an indication of the broad implications of such ideological *detachment processes* for families and relationships – processes whose specific consequences Jacky was unable to foresee at that time.

The great *psycho-biographical complexity* of such detachment processes is further underlined by the fact that, during this phase of development, Jacky gradually reached a point where she could work through her experience of her mother's premature death, perceive this immense personal loss as real for the first time in her life, and develop corresponding emotional responses that had previously been omitted. "The other day I had the idea of going to the cemetery, because the lease for the grave had probably ended". When Jacky was twelve and her brother and father told her the news of her mother's death following a long period of illness, her reaction was: "I don't believe it. You're kidding me." In the interview, Jacky summed up her experience as follows: "I couldn't really grasp what was going on. At the funeral I somehow couldn't have a proper cry at all". Instead, she began to experience the psychosomatic and psycho-social phenomena described above – one of which was right-wing extremism. "During this time Jacky [also became] aware – even though she had already known it for some two years – that her maternal grandmother died and lay dead in her flat for several days before being found." When Jacky started to think about her mother and maternal grandmother, she was however emotionally overwhelmed, and it appears that she initially responded in this instance, too, with an episode of severe physical and psychosomatic phenomena. During this period she experienced unusual allergic reactions, outgrowths of bodily tissue, and dramatic weight loss and hair loss. It is at this point that the processes of biographical-scientific data acquisition and case work came to an end, while the biographical process of detachment from extremist views is certainly still underway.

The following needs to be made as clear as possible: a person's most intimate emotional issues and experiences relating to their family are directly linked, via tortuous mental paths, with their ideological constructs and extremist opinions. Clearly both of these, apparently so different, affective areas occupy central roles in a person's psycho-emotional system. It thus appears that they can only be processed with lasting effect by considering them within their relationship to each other, and over a medium-term time frame. They require process-oriented, relationship-based intervention methods that interdisciplinary research has shown to be effective, and which are willing to make use of clinical psychological resources. As Köttig concludes on the basis of Jacky's intense psychosomatic reactions during this life phase of familial consolidation, relationship formation and recollection: for Jacky, the process of "engaging with previously dissociated feelings of grief, pain and weakness, which she approaches through the topic of her mother's death", is a very difficult one. "The severe traumatisation she experienced in her childhood means that she will hardly be capable of coping with this alone", and "it is particularly important for Jacky to accept psychotherapeutic help" – for her personally and also to enable her to abstain from violence and extremism.

Psycho-social factors. The underpinning of extremist and violent activities by factors in a person's life history may not be equally pronounced in all participants in the VPN courses, for example because the factor of sexual assault is not likely to be as frequent for male scene members/offenders. But the relationship in general is clearly evident. As already mentioned, process-oriented, relationship-based work that maintains "subject orientation and conflict sensitivity" and which deals with participants' "social-emotional" biographical development is the only option. A great deal of money and effort can be saved, and lasting benefits achieved, if future intervention strategies can take into account this often-demonstrated fact and all of its methodological implications.

F. Two OSCE guides: addressing issues of educational methods countering contemporary anti-Semitism as well as intolerance and discrimination against Muslims.¹⁶

These two guide documents published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provide methodological suggestions for “teachers and other educators” and, thus, pertain rather to the field of preventative work than first-line deradicalisation work. Yet, from a methodological point of view it is to be expected that the same principles apply in both fields. A comparative glance may therefore indicate how and to what extent the OSCE guidelines parallel and reconfirm the results of the aforementioned research results on first-line deradicalisation interventions.

F.1 “Educational methods countering contemporary anti-Semitism”

This guide was developed by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in collaboration with the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, formerly called the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, and with Jewish organizations – among them the Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority, Jerusalem – and prominent academics.

“According to the ODIHR’s annual report for 2006 on hate crimes in the OSCE region, the number of attacks against Jewish schools increased in many countries while Jewish pupils were assaulted, harassed, and injured in growing numbers on their way to and from school or in the classroom, including by their classmates. Educators report that the term ‘Jew’ has become a popular swearword among youngsters.”

In the section “Methodological Principles and Strategies”, the Guide mentions “several challenges to achieving” (8 et seq.) the education goals:

“First, teachers and other educators are often committed to condemning anti-Semitic views, the use of anti-Semitic stereotypes, and any other expressions of intolerance and discrimination. At the same time, they want to take pupils who hold or express these views seriously. In other words, teachers strive to counter these views while reaching out to the student.”

“Another conceivable challenge is caused by the desire to promote human rights, such as freedom of religion and freedom of speech, while opposing the abuse of this freedom for racist and anti-Semitic purposes.”

“Moreover, teachers might want to provide their students with a comprehensive picture of the history of anti-Semitism, anti-Jewish stereotypes, and the need to reject this deeply rooted hatred. At the same time, they may want to ensure that this teaching is not dogmatic, but rather interactive, interesting, and engaging... (and) without being overwhelmed.”

The following methodological suggestions are made¹⁷

Establish a constructive environment –

“Teachers and students should create an *inclusive atmosphere*, in which *everybody feels safe* to discuss sensitive issues openly. Ground rules that allow for an *honest* discussion in a *respectful* way should be developed. Teachers should be aware of hierarchies in the classroom and try to integrate all learners into this

16 “Addressing Anti-Semitism: Why and How? A Guide for Educators” (2007), ed. by The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE - ODIHR); “Guidelines for Educators on Countering Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims” (2011).

17 P. 8 – 10 of the OSCE guide, partly referring to “Developing Local Democracy Against Right Wing Extremism: Examples of good practice in East Germany”, Information Leaflet No. 23, UNITED for Intercultural Action website, <<http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/pages/info23.htm>>.

process. Students should be given the *benefit of the doubt*. The creation of such an environment may support teachers in their attempt to discover why a student subscribes to anti-Semitic views and stereotypes, as fears, frustrations, and negative personal experiences tend to make individuals more susceptible to easy solutions offered by these ideologies." (OSCE 8-10)

Be patient –

"Teachers should *allow time for a process to develop* and proceed step by step. One way of doing this is to introduce less complex topics first or to find a starting point that relates and appeals to the students. It may also be advisable to keep the topic in view, i.e., to refer back to it in the context of another teaching unit, if there is a connection. *Patience* is also required in finding the right approach for different age groups and providing the right level of information." (ibid.)

Be clear and consistent in your reactions –

"Teachers should be prepared to *respond* to manifestations of anti-Semitism in the classroom, as silence conveys the impression that prejudiced behaviour is condoned or not worthy of attention. While different ways and *strategies of reacting* to such expressions may seem appropriate in different situations and contexts, it should always be clear to the students that there is a *policy of zero tolerance* with respect to anti-Semitism. *Transparency and clarity* towards pupils and their families is critical in this respect." (ibid.)

Avoid preaching –

"Preaching is an ineffective methodology for changing prejudiced attitudes; in fact, it often produces the opposite effect. Educators should therefore provide opportunities for students to *resolve conflicts, discuss problems, work in diverse teams, and think critically*. In the end, *interactive and engaging teaching* strategies may ensure that this difficult topic is not avoided by students, but rather becomes an issue in which some of them may even develop a deeper and long-lasting interest." (ibid.)

Remember that individuals make a difference –

"Every person has a choice and is therefore *responsible* for (her/his) own actions. Examples from history and contemporary society can be useful when illustrating this principle. Students should have the opportunity to realise and learn that *they are responsible* for their actions, while also recognizing the impact of those choices. This includes making them aware of the positive effect on the community that civic engagement and *socially responsible behaviour* can have." (ibid.)

Be realistic –

"Even if teachers should always try to prevent and respond to anti-Semitism, there are, of course, limitations. It is important to establish goals and to realistically assess the possibilities and *limitations of educational efforts*. Naturally, a single teacher with limited resources and time constraints will not be able to fully solve the problem of anti-Semitism." (ibid.)

Encourage self-reflection –

"Teachers and students alike *should reflect on the images* of Jews that come to their mind and think about whether they have been influenced by prejudice. If there are Jewish students present in the class, it is important to be sensitive to their perspectives. As in all cases of prejudice, the learning process can evolve around realizing that individual experiences or characteristics should not be generalised and projected onto an entire group." (ibid.)

Use life experiences –

“Teachers can provide opportunities for students *to share life experiences*. The classroom can be a place where diversity is appreciated and *students’ experiences* are not marginalised, trivialised, or invalidated. Many learners will find it easier to start talking about anti-Semitism if they have an opportunity to focus on *their own experiences*, such as with discrimination and multiple identities. At the same time, they should learn to abstract from their own experience and to differentiate rather than generalise.” (ibid.)

Develop critical thinking –

“In order to combat prejudice, it is important to become aware of *different perspectives*. For example, the reading of a source that is written from the point of view of a Jewish person who experienced anti-Semitism may create a greater *understanding and empathy* for what it feels like to be discriminated against or offended by manifestations of anti-Semitism. Taking different perspectives also comes into play when *studying pictures and images*. Learners should be shown that some pictures of Jews were purposefully taken by anti-Semites. For example, it may be important to ask students to analyse the motive of the person behind the camera.” (ibid.)

Try to avoid victimization –

“Jews should not be perceived as victims. Rather, they are *individuals* who have their *own lives and personalities* and whose identity is made up of many *different components*.” (ibid.)

Focus on the diversity of what it means to be Jewish –

“Anti-Semitism works through stereotyping, generalizations, and false attribution. In order to counterbalance these distortions, it can be useful to introduce learners to *many diverse examples* of what it means to be Jewish. Different approaches to this identity can be found in both history and contemporary society, also among youngsters.” (ibid.)

Connect the school with the wider community –

“It may be worthwhile to involve *parents, other family members, and the wider community* in the learning process, as they provide the context (both positive and negative) in which students are motivated to learn. Ideally, a wider network in support of tolerance may emerge from these efforts.” (ibid.)

Call in help when necessary –

“The school administration, parents, the police, and the wider community should be consulted in cases of violence or ongoing harassment.” (ibid.)

● Conclusion:

Leaving aside the formulations that are specific for the educational settings which the guides target (e.g. “information”, “teaching unit”, “introduce topics”, “educational efforts”, “the learners”), and also leaving aside formulations that pertain to anti-Semitism specifically, the principle methodological suggestions given in this guide do parallel and reconfirm the results of the aforementioned research results on first-line deradicalisation interventions. This holds true especially for the guidelines pertaining to trust, respect, open process, accepting/ confronting interaction style.

F.2 Guidelines for Educators on Countering Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims

The guidelines were developed jointly by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Council of Europe and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders, including education experts, teachers, civil society representatives and governmental officials.

The base motivation for producing the guide was: "Muslims are often portrayed as extremists who threaten the security and well-being of others. The ideologies based on ideas of 'us versus them' have reinforced the prejudiced image of Muslims as 'enemies', in the absence of shared histories or accurate knowledge of different cultures and religions." (13)

For this reason, "most of the strategies and approaches set out in this paper are applicable to dealing with any form of intolerance and discrimination. In general, strategies to help with learning to live together, education to promote mutual respect and understanding, and citizenship and human rights education lay a base for a more cohesive and peaceful society." (13)

In Chapter 3 – "Methodological principles and approaches" – among several issues of general educational relevance it is stated that:

"First, teachers are responsible *not only for teaching* about the subject matter, but also for *promoting mutual respect and understanding* among the students. Therefore, they should take seriously and react to any expressions of anti-Muslim views or use of stereotypes. Teachers should find sensitive ways to address such actions and attitudes with the student population in general, and should *reach out* both to students who have been hurt or distressed and to students who have expressed such views. While addressing these issues, teachers need to make sure that Muslims are not perceived or presented always simply as "victims". Rather, they should be *recognised as individuals* who have their own lives and *personalities* and whose *identity* is made up of *many different components*." (pp. 23)

"... A number of international instruments set out that education is intended not only to provide strictly academic or technical training but that it should also inculcate such *values as human rights, tolerance, pluralism, antiracism and international and inter-communal harmony*." (ibid.)

Aside from these merely value-based – and thus rather abstract – recommendations, clear advice is given to use a "participatory" and "experiential" approach:

"Students and educators will not necessarily change their behaviour just because they are told to. Students learn best when the method is participatory, with learners *experiencing and experimenting*. This can involve a number of whole-school approaches, both inside and outside the classroom, such as: involvement of students in school governance activities, for example the development of codes of conduct" (24).

"On another level, a good practice in developing curriculum related to minorities – including religious minorities – is that the curriculum should be developed with the active participation of bodies representative of the minorities in question." (25)

This includes "focus group work" led by people from outside, from a nongovernmental organization:

"As participants of focus groups are easily identifiable, it is very important that the moderator *creates a safe environment* in which participants are able to *express themselves without fear*. In this regard, it is recommended that an experienced

person, for example, *someone from a nongovernmental organization* dealing with discrimination and intolerance, should be asked to moderate the discussion and present the results.” (28)

Working towards recognizing the individuality and relativity of each person involved is key to this approach of teaching and educational work:

“To this end, teachers should help students to realise that — just as in the case of their own cultural identities — Muslims’ cultural identities are not monolithic, but are dynamic and diverse. Teachers should...help students to strike the right balance between the individual and the collective, and to prevent exclusion.” (30)

The emphasis is, here too, on *narrative* and on *case studies*:

“If prepared case studies are not available, students can research cases and issues on the Internet, and present their findings, for example, researching the demography of the Muslim population, or the diversity within it.” (36).

Narrative case study work then lends itself quite naturally to *describing life experiences*:

“Teachers can provide opportunities for *students to share life experiences*. The classroom can be a place where diversity is appreciated and students’ experiences are not marginalised, trivialised or invalidated. Many learners will find it easier to start talking about discrimination and intolerance against Muslims if they have an opportunity to *focus on their own experiences*, for example, discrimination based on multiple identities. At the same time, students should *learn to abstract from* their own experience and to differentiate, rather than generalise. Examples of co-operation and solidarity among different religious groups, including Muslims, should also be shared.” (37)

This implies educational tools from *the oral history* tradition:

“*Resources that tell stories* relevant to discrimination or intolerance against Muslims can help students to personalise the representation of being a Muslim, for they enable them to recognise something familiar, while, at the same time, discovering something new. Such resources can be especially useful for students who may have very limited contacts with Muslims.” (38)

It also implies going beyond the limits of the institution as such towards the outside context – i.e. *connecting the school with the wider community*:

“It may be worthwhile to involve *parents*, other *family* members and *the wider community*, including community-based associations, in the learning process, as they provide the context (both positive and negative) in which students are motivated to learn. Ideally, *a wider network in support* of mutual understanding may emerge from these efforts.” (38)

The *factor of culture and the media* and the ability to understand and analyse media products – *critical literacy and media skills* – but also the ability to relate to them in a personal and reflexive manner, is key.

“*Deconstructing* the politics of representation and demystifying stereotypes are *key critical skills*. Media skills can be developed through examining a selection of literature, films, cartoons, advertising, websites, computer games and other *forms of cultural representation* and *image-making* that show Muslims both negatively and positively, and analyzing the language and images that are used. ...” (pp. 39)

Moreover, *one's own cultural and aesthetic creativity* in generating cultural artifacts oneself is crucial:

"... Further, such education can enable people to be *skilful creators and producers* of media messages themselves." (39)

Youth-cultural approaches of co-narrative creativity are particularly impactful:

"Using art and artists – Muslim youth have become active in using arts such as hip hop, spoken-word poetry, comedy and visual arts, including theatre, to portray and combat the discrimination they face, as well as to speak out against radicalism and extremism. The work of such artists can be integrated into activities, lessons or school events to bring a new understanding of Muslim youth that challenges common misperceptions and stereotypes, and allows the struggles of these youth to be expressed ..."

However, one should add from a critical standpoint, that the target to "combat the discrimination" and to express "scenes of experienced discrimination" should not be the exclusive perspective – since this might be perceived more as moralistic than creative and narrative. Other aspects – even aspects of being a perpetrator of unfairness and discrimination oneself - should be included in the approach.

This also holds true for the *discussion about stereotypes*:

"Schools should seek to provide opportunities for *discussion about stereotypes* and portrayals of Muslims. Discussions might take place in the classroom or in outside contexts, or might draw on outside experts or visitors." (24)

"... They should address both *conscious and unconscious expressions of stereotypes* of Muslims. Discussions can touch also on types of prejudice other than anti-Muslim, perhaps comparing different targets of discrimination and drawing on international human rights standards to demonstrate the universality of basic concepts of non-discrimination." (ibid)

However, some of the then listed stereotypes are more than just stereotypes – and would require a different and more intense pedagogical setting:

"Muslims are seen as all being much the same as each other, regardless of their nationality, social class and political outlook, and regardless of whether they are observant in their beliefs and practice. ..." (27).

"It is thought that the single most important thing about Muslims, in all circumstances, is their religious faith. So, if Muslims engage in violence, for example, it is assumed that this is because their religion advocates violence. ..."

"Muslims are seen as totally "other" – they are seen as having few if any interests, needs or values in common with people who do not have a Muslim background. A consequence is that Muslims are not seen as possessing insights or wisdom from which people with different religious or cultural backgrounds may learn and benefit. ..."

"Muslims are seen as culturally and morally inferior and prone to being irrational and violent, intolerant in their treatment of women, contemptuous towards world views different from their own, and hostile and resentful towards "the West" for no good reason. ..."

"Muslims are seen as a security threat. Globally, they are engaged in 'a clash of civilizations', and within those countries where they make up a minority, they are an 'enemy within', in tacit or open sympathy with international terrorism and bent on the 'Islamization' of the countries where they live. ..."

Especially the fact that Muslims are seen as being totally “other” and as “culturally and morally inferior” – and that they are seen “as threat”, are *psycho-dynamically determined fears and anxieties* which generally rest on a *biographical predisposition* and thus would need a different and more intense methodological setting to be addressed properly and in a sustainable manner.

G. Overall Conclusion: general guidelines and principles of good-practice anti hate crime and deradicalisation interventions – and their contextual prerequisites

Taken together, all the above refereed international good-practice studies (TPVR, LIPAV, Fed. Model Projects, Lützing study, Copenhagen conference, OSCE recommendations) – as well as the experiences from the Belfast CHC project – indicate that there are *over-arching principles* of successful good-practice in anti hate crime and deradicalisation interventions. These *principles* are assumed to apply across various different societal milieus – and different sorts of hate crime and extremism – and they are assumed to be applicable in the different institutions where anti hate crime interventions may be called for (prison, probation, schools/youth clubs, community institutions etc.) in all EU Member States.

Hence good-practice deradicalisation interventions are characterised by the following *practice guidelines* and impact-factors:

G.1 The good-practice intervention itself – and its components

(i) Building trust and relationship is key

Good-practice interventions are successful – above all – in *building personal trust*. In other words: they manage to provide a safe space for establishing a *sustainably trust- and respect-based work relationship* between the client and the practitioner(s) – and between the clients as a group themselves. This constitutes a big challenge since it means to build trust with a type of client that is generally very distrustful and volatile (sometimes bordering on a paranoid mind set).

Yet, *building personal trust* is by far the most important requirement for any good-practice exit hate crime approach! Successful trust-building is absolutely indispensable. However and wherever deradicalisation programmes are employed (prison, probation, schools etc.), trust is the all or nothing prerequisite – without which an intervention will have only limited success.

It is important to note here, that a trusting work relationship is substantially different from a *fraternizing comradeship*, as among buddies, fellows, etc. (which typically exists in adolescent groups). Rather, the establishment of a *trusting work relationship* will always rest both on the element of support/respect and confrontation/ critique. Moreover, it will have a clear focus on agreed objectives of the joint work effort – e.g. the client's development of certain personal skills.

Success in building trust between clients and practitioners is, in good practice, predicated both on the *personal talent and skills of the facilitator* (see xii) and on one crucial *institutional condition of trust*: it requires that *independent, non-statutory, and non-governmental practitioners* from outside the institution are involved – and that their work is accompanied by visible *trust between statutory and non-governmental actors* (see xiv, xv and xvi).

(ii) The narrative mode – versus debate/ argumentation

In their methodology, good-practice practitioners generally focus on facilitating *narrative exchange* – as opposed to argumentative and debate-like discussion. *Narrative exchange* means that the clients share *personally lived-through* experiences that form a part of their individual's biographical memory and carry personal investment – as well as emotional charge.

Narrative exchange and trust-building are closely interlinked – and depend on each other. By the same token, narrative exchange implies engaging in a *lifeworld*

and *relationship based* interaction. Moreover, it frequently focuses on personal ambivalences and conflicts which the client may have experienced – consciously or unconsciously.

Hence, successful good-practice anti hate crime and deradicalisation practitioners will manage to build and support in their clients the *capacity to partake in narrative inter-personal exchange* with others – and recount *personal memories and thoughts* of emotional significance that carry a potential of conflict. This means ...

- Supporting the client's development of a new sense and appreciation for *telling stories*, i.e. *narrating personally experienced occurrences* of subjective significance – and also, with caution, expressing the either positive or negative emotional charge that these experiences may carry.
- Supporting her/his ability to *actively listen* to and respect such narrations with others and, in fact, *co-narrate* them, i.e. gain the capacity to actively encourage and assist the story-telling process of other participants within the group.
- Instilling a new attitude towards and appreciation of *personal memories* and of *remembering and recounting* events of personal (family) history.
- This focus on a trust-based and narrative story telling exchange will particularly, and cautiously, include experiences of *embarrassment/ shame, insecurity, fear, helplessness, also aggression, hostility and violence* – since these affects have proven to play a major role in generating acts of hostility and hate violence.
- It will also entail the acknowledgement of experiences of *personal ambivalence, self-contradiction, internal conflict* and experiences of *compromise*.

(iii) Emotional intelligence – rather than cognitive

Good-practice anti hate crime and deradicalisation interventions put the emphasis on *emotional learning* and *emotional intelligence* rather than cognitive learning. It specifically aims at acquiring *conflict intelligence*, i.e. the ability to handle conflict in productive ways. This also means that these interventions don't overstress any educational 'topic' or 'intellectual issue' as such. Instead they focus on the subjective – and most often conflictive – dimension of any topic and on 'identity issues'. *Emotional and conflict learning* needs to be the main focus due to the well-known fact that prejudices, hostility and hate crime are first and foremost emotional phenomena – even if they are attached to elements of cognitive and ideological reasoning.

(iv) Voluntary participation – and incremental buy-in

In good-practice anti hate crime and deradicalisation interventions participants sign up *on a voluntary basis* only – voluntary in the sense that enrolling and attending is up to the participants' own decision and is carried by their own motivation. This means that participation must not be assigned or mandatory, and drop-out must not be held against the client and go on her/his records in any way.

By the same token, only modest forms of *incentive* – if any at all – should be held out for participants.

Voluntary participation does, however, not at all rule out motivational one-to-one conversations and mentoring in order to encourage and support any person once she/he has expressed some minimal degree of interest in taking part in the intervention. Here, the principals of *incremental buy-in* and *steadily increasing commitment* and reliability apply.

(v) Group-based intervention work is key

In good-practice approaches significant parts of the work take place *in the group and with the group*, and thus attention is paid to the process and *group-dynamic* relationships of the participants with one another. No one-to-one intervention can

possibly be as effective and profound in its deradicalising impact as a group work approach.

Good-practice group work approaches will secure a *conducive dosage* of group intensity. They will offset and balance the group work by pedagogical exercises and supplementary one-to-one sessions of support for individual clients whenever the need arises.

(vi) Open-process, participatory approach – and methodological flexibility

Good-practice interventions aim at generating an *open-process interaction* in which the participants' reactions and suggestions are acknowledged as priority. Open-process interaction is indispensable for building trust, respect and commitment with difficult to engage client groups.

Open-process interaction means that the general pedagogical principle of '*Actual disturbances or conflicts have the right of way*' applies – as is generally the case in settings of informal education and state-of-the-art social mentoring work. One characteristic element of an open-process approach would be, for instance, that every group or individual session routinely begins with a '*flashlight round*' in which each group member may comment as to 'How is it going?', 'What's been happening since last time?' etc. The issues/ experiences which are voiced here may then take up the whole of the session.

Therefore, good-practice interventions have *no set toolbox*. Rather, they generally show *methodological flexibility* and *eclecticism* with regard to pedagogic tools and resources. By the same token, there is *no strict syllabus* or *fixed session plan* in good-practice interventions. Open process- and relationship-based work means that the client group's spontaneous issues and topics are given priority while the facilitators make suggestions only.

All open-process approaches are 'participatory' in nature. Clients or students will not necessarily change their behaviour just because they are told/ taught to. Any educational or training intervention will thus always be participatory, with clients experiencing and experimenting with issues of prejudice, extremism and harassment.

(vii) Likely topics and issues of open-process anti hate crime work

Regarding the *topics and issues* which may come up and/or be suggested by the facilitators in this open-process narrative group-work intervention: in view of the Lützinger-study on violent extremists and terrorists as well as other recent research in anti hate crime methodology, these topics will, most likely, encompass among others:

- commonly shared and/or individual *biographical issues* and *social circumstances*;
- experiences of *dysfunctional parenting*, unstable family conditions and chronic relational stress (which clients are often hardly aware of). This most often encompasses experiences of *deprivation, denigration and violent victimization* in the family (which clients tend to belittle or deny), also: experience of *alcohol and drugs* as dysfunctional coping strategies;
- one's own *patterns* of behaviour as member of a group and/or within the group work intervention itself;
- e.g. one's tendency to install *power relationships*;
- events/ experiences within a clique as '*surrogate family*' – and becoming dependent on it;
- experiences of *being recruited* in a personally targeted manner;
- *friendship, loyalty* – versus *dependency/ enslavement*;

- *gender issues*, as manliness / maleness, the other sex, homosexuality etc.;
- particularly important: the scenes of having *acted as a perpetrator/ victimiser*, ... of having committed acts of hatred, denigration and violence against others;
- politics/ religion, discussing and reflecting upon *internalised ideological beliefs* – and looking at and confronting *simplified thought patterns* and *pseudo-logical explanations*;
- issues of overlap/ multiplication of "*intra- and extra-familial conflicts*";
- issues of national or/and international events and *geopolitical conflicts* – as portrayed *in the media*; and
- *fictional media narratives* in their particular function in personal thought and action.

Of particular *narrative-emotional* intensity will be the group sessions on scenes of hostile/ violent acting-out, committed brutalities and hate crimes – often in combination with the exchange about experiences of victimization and denigration. Some practice experience and studies indicate: a frank and detailed exchange about the scenes in which the clients have committed acts of hostility and violence/ hate crime is key for good-practice anti hate crime interventions.

Of particular *narrative-cognitive* importance will be the exchange on thought patterns, beliefs, attitudes and ideologies of denigrating others and claiming superiority of oneself – and the reflection on how they relate to one's own biographical issues.

Conversely, what does not lend itself to supporting open-process narrative exchange and developing personal capacities of (co-)narrative interaction, is: cognitive-behavioural training programmes with a modular structure, as they are currently applied in many sectors of this work area. Quite on the contrary, cognitive-behavioural approaches often serve the function of avoiding the direct (co-)narrative interaction among facilitators and clients and instead produce obedience – and thus forgo the most powerful impact factor of inducing personal change.

(viii) Civic education – and political debate

While the modus of narrative, emotional and lifeworld oriented exchange is prevalent in good-practice approaches, issues and strategies of *civic education* and *political/ ideological debate* need to be part of the intervention. However, it is important to keep in mind that it is generally not too helpful to talk ideology or morals to people with extremist/ fundamentalist leanings. Because even with them, ideology/ religion wasn't an issue in the first place but came later as secondary add-on to their pre-existing extremist/ delinquent disposition.

Rather the *ideological beliefs* – and *simplified attitudes/ opinions* – which are, in fact, internalised in the course of an extremist's biography, need to be worked with systematically through observing these beliefs' emotional investment and biographical embedding in the person's life-history. Hence, instead of aiming to win arguments, the maximum effect one may aim for with these clients is putting in 'seeds of doubt' – since for these clients doubts, questions and ambivalences, generally, are not accepted as viable options of thought.

Politics needs to be an issue also with regard to media and *party-political discourses*. The ways in which partisan political parties (of the centre, right, left) speak about – or do not speak about and implicitly deny – extremism is often quite ambiguous. Therefore these party-political discourses need to be openly addressed to show clearly that extremism is an issue for society and the political sphere at large.

When the clients hold ideologies from migration backgrounds, as for instance Jihadist attitudes, international and *geopolitical conflicts* need to be addressed.

(ix) Pedagogical exercises from 'democracy education' and 'human rights education' – emphasis of personal responsibility

There are various traditions of methods for educational group settings that help to render more graspable and lucid what democracy, non-discrimination and human rights mean in actual living practice. 'Diversity training', 'anti-bias work' and other such approaches may – if not overdone – help a group to internalise experiences of human rights, respect, anti-racism etc. and thus build democratic and liberal society values.

To mention just two examples of quite simple techniques: (1) If any group that is built for an anti hate crime intervention is at first encouraged to debate the general rules of conduct which it wants to set out for itself – as well as on its values and objectives as group – there are hardly any offenders of hate crimes who, at this stage of getting involved in an intervention, would not naturally opt to subscribe to rules of fairness, respect and non-discrimination within the group. (2) If clients are encouraged to build a routine of giving feedback about the sessions or parts of the programme and about certain inputs given by fellow clients, this routine induces a new sense of responsibility vis-à-vis one's context.

(x) The element of history – narrated events

By the same token, good-practice narrative anti hate crime interventions always have an intrinsically *historical dimension* – albeit possibly a very simple one which certainly does not require systematic teaching of 'history lessons'. This historical dimension means that the intervention in effect raises awareness for the plain fact that things in life develop over time, depend on given formative real-world circumstances and are changeable in principle. History is conveyed as something which can be recounted as a personal story of lived-through experiences. History is, thus, at first dealt with as *individual life-history* of the clients. Secondly history is approached as the *socio-political and family historical conditions* of that life-history – i.e. History in the usual sense.

(xi) The factor of culture/ youth culture – and fictional media narratives

Good-practice approaches of anti hate crime and deradicalisation work observe the *factor of culture and media* – and of *co-narrative creativity*. They bring in cultural and fictional media narratives and work with them – and they encourage creativity and reflexive thought.

- This means firstly that the interventions take into account that young people generally like to express themselves creatively and/or discursively, e.g. in the form of *youth-cultural self-expression* (music, images, dance, speech, media products). Hence, these approaches are product- and goal-oriented in the sense that the participants produce creative *youth-cultural and media artifacts*.
- Moreover, young people are avid users of media, in particular of *fictional media narratives* (films, TV, on-line, songs etc.) which carry personal investments of identity issues and/or have 'entertainment' functions. For this very reason, internet-based recruiting and radicalizing, too, uses a variety of narrative patterns. Hence, the fictional media narratives of the young peoples' own personal liking and choice can be used in particular settings. These are specifically geared towards working with fictional narratives to the effect that the participants engage in a process of personal reflection and change.

G.2 The context factors of good-practice intervention programmes

(xii) The practitioners' skills/ talent – and intervention style

In good-practice interventions *the practitioners' professional persona, individual talent and communication skills* as well as her/his *intervention style* will lend themselves to generating a trustful and resilient work relationship, based on narrative open-process interaction – in both group and one-to-one exchange.

In particular, the practitioners will employ an *interaction style* which signals *trustworthiness, personal authenticity and institutional independence*. Furthermore, the practitioners will be without fear of the setting (e.g. prison, probation, school) and the kind of clients (e.g. hate crime offenders, radicalised and possibly aggressive young men). Rather the practitioners feel respect, personal interest and curiosity for the clients and their issues.

Hence, they will not be distant/judgmental or fraternal/complicit. Rather s/he will employ an interaction style of *critical attentiveness – or respectful enquiry –* which encompasses aspects of both understanding /support and contention/ conflict with the client(s). This interaction style is *accepting and confrontational* at the same time.

Good practice practitioners will, thereby, always observe a basic distinction *between the person* of the client, which is accepted and respected, and *the offence behaviour* and violently extremist opinions which are not accepted but confronted.

(xiii) Quality management and assistance for practitioners

For their challenging work the independent outside-practitioners (from NGOs/ NPOs) rely on sound professional assistance and systematic measures of *quality management* in order to empower them and strengthen their *professionalism*. Here, mechanisms of *case supervision, practice exchange with colleagues, and additional training* may be employed. Some good-practice organizations in this field do already engage in the *development of adequate quality management* procedures.

(xiv) Independent outside practitioners – confidentiality

With regard to the *formal setting* of good-practice interventions, it is most important that the *facilitators come from outside the institution* of their clients (prison, probation, schools etc.). The facilitators of deradicalisation processes need to be able to *act independently* and, thus, *grant a safe and confidential space* for the work with their clients.

In light of the indispensable element of trust and confidence-building, *independence and confidentiality* are key requirements of good-practice anti hate crime work, without which an intervention has only little prospect of success and may even have adverse effects. Because, firstly, a radicalised person – or any institutionalised person – will hardly be able to build sustainable trust vis-à-vis an institutional government employee who has power over and writes reports on her/him. Secondly, a person that joins a – state-of-the-art – anti hate crime intervention is up for processes of personal change which touch upon quite deep-seated and sensitive affects and memories. This undertaking compares to a process of personal coaching or psychotherapy – and nobody would regard it reasonable to receive coaching or psychotherapy from a practitioner who has existential power over her/him (like family or job superiors). Therefore, the independent outside anti hate crime practitioners must have the authority to provide a *secure and confidential space* for the clients to speak and interact freely.

(xv) The institution supports the outside practitioners

However, good practice delivered by independent outside practitioners heavily relies on *the institution itself*. The institution needs to be on board. It needs to actively signal its high esteem for the incoming facilitators – and its readiness to support, secure and carry on the results of their work. For this purpose institutional staff need to be trained and educated about the complexity of anti hate crime and deradicalisation work. Statutory employees and leadership may, thus, ask for *consultancy and staff training* from the independent practitioners and/or their organization – in order to be able to better sustain the work done by the practitioners.

(xvi) Funding NGOs – trust between state and non-governmental sector

Allowing for independent outside practitioners to play a key role in the anti hate crime work of governmental institutions (prison, probation, schools etc.) also relies on *statutory and budgetary structures* – for financial reasons and for reasons of principle. It requires providing a modus of stable funding for experienced non-governmental practitioners' organizations – which are mostly NGOs and civil society organizations. At present, these organizations' funding is notoriously insecure and entirely project-based. They are thus hindered, among other things, from establishing state-of-the-art quality management and achieving sound professional standing.

The financial insecurity also undermines another key element of building resilient societies and effective societal prevention structures: there needs to be *visible trust between governmental and non-governmental* organizations. Given that for most extremisms/ terrorisms the state is a key enemy image and a target of attack, visible trust between statutory and civil community actors is a key impact factor of deradicalisation in its own right.

The EC's 2009 *Stockholm Programme* rightly states: "Key to our success (in deradicalisation) will be the degree to which non-governmental groups [...] across Europe play an active part". Future programmes are likely to reconfirm and even go beyond this, realizing that non-governmental personnel should not only play an "active part" but fulfil key functions of deradicalisation.

(xvii) Awareness in main-stream society is key

Often, the arguments, attitudes and affects of most extremism(s) are partly shared by substantial segments of mainstream society. Moreover, extremists, usually being brought up within segments of mainstream society, are in many respects 'socially produced' by mainstream society. There is ample proof that their individual evolution into extremist thought and violently hostile action significantly correlates with particular family and community situations around them – which are accepted by mainstream society. This includes many perceived and real grievances and injustices.

Hence, any good-practice anti hate crime and deradicalisation work will take notice of these grievances and take into account the fact that mainstream society – and governmental representatives – may on occasion or regularly act in less than human-rights affirming ways.

(xviii) Media and party-political discourses

Party-political and media discourses on extremism issues are of crucial importance both for societal awareness and deradicalisation interventions. The manner in which representatives from government, and the different political parties from left to right, speak about extremism related issues – as for instance about the perpetrators, victims, about endemic prejudices, current enemy images and social scapegoats – needs to be paid attention to. Good-practice anti hate crime and deradicalisation interventions take these discourses into account and reflect upon them by means of systematic methods of human-rights focused *civic education* (see xix).

(xix) Family – and representatives of civil society

In addition to specialised deradicalisation practitioners coming from outside into the institution, good-practice interventions will always encompass an extra element of civil society and community organisation. Hence, members of *different groups of civil society* should be able to come into the institution (prison, schools etc.) as interlocutors and witnesses – e.g. ex-offenders, people who have exited extremist life-styles, victims of extremist acts, respected/ charismatic representatives from mainstream society. Particularly, family members may contribute to the deradicalisation process. However, the participation of family and people from the community has to be systematically mediated by the practitioners. Also it needs to be embedded into and offset by the continuous anti hate crime intervention (group work) in the institution.

Here the *security perspective* on extremism has to be supplemented by an *inclusive civil society perspective*. Bridges need to be build across distinctions such as “civil and public, professional and volunteer, local, national and international, East and West” (2012 Copenhagen Convention see Section C).

(xx) Trans-institutional support relationships – post-release coaching

What is most obvious from working with clients in prisons: disengaging from extremism requires *supportive relationships and mentorships* which last over time and, most importantly, remain in place when the client leaves an institution and moves on towards a new sphere of life.

With imprisoned clients such mentorships are preferably inaugurated already during prison time and carried over into the post-release time. Firstly, the anti hate crime practitioner her/himself with whom the client worked in prison may accompany him/her during the early phases of her/his time in the community. This non-statutory practitioner may provide *post-institutional coaching and change management* for the client. Secondly, suitable family members, friends or community members whose personality and practical help fit the needs and challenges of reintegrating the client, may already be called upon during imprisonment in order to form a support relationship. This holds true for all sorts of instances in which clients change her/his sphere of life (prison-community, probation-apprenticeship, school-work etc.).

(xxi) Long-term interventions are needed

Good-practice approaches in anti hate crime and deradicalisation work are in principle *long-term*, and the interventions are visibly carried by a *long-term institutional and societal commitment*. Project style short-/middle-term interventions may sometimes be counter-productive, because anything other than a long-term offer will not be able to induce trust with clients that generally have not had much experience of long-term commitment and responsibility in their lives. However, these long-term offers are attached to demands and challenges – according to the principle of accepting-confrontational work (c.f. ‘critical attentiveness’, see xii).

(xxii) What doesn’t work - anti-aggression and cognitive-behavioural training

Regarding the reverse question of *which approach has little effect* in exit hate crime and deradicalisation work, the quoted evaluations and practitioner exchanges agree on the pitfalls and shortcomings of (a) fully modularised *cognitive-behavioural training programmes* and (b) of pure *anti-aggression trainings*. Unless these techniques are carefully embedded into a solid methodological framework of an open-process, relationship-based and narrative intervention approach (which is hardly ever the case) cognitive-behavioural and anti-aggression trainings will be less effective than generally expected – and carry considerable risks of adverse effects.

G.3 Summary of general principles of good-practice anti hate crime and deradicalisation interventions

- (1) The good-practice intervention itself – and its components
 - (i) Building trust and relationship is key
 - (ii) The narrative mode – versus debate/ argumentation
 - (iii) Emotional intelligence – rather than cognitive
 - (iv) Voluntary participation – and incremental buy-in
 - (v) Group-based intervention work is key
 - (vi) Open-process, participatory approach – and methodological flexibility
 - (vii) Likely topics and issues of open-process anti hate crime work
 - (viii) Civic education – and political debate
 - (ix) Pedagogical exercises from ‘democracy education’ and ‘human rights education’ – emphasis on personal responsibility
 - (x) The element of history – narrated events
 - (xi) The factor of culture/ youth culture – and fictional media narratives

- (2) The context factors of good-practice intervention programmes
 - (xii) The practitioners’ skills/ talent – and intervention style
 - (xiii) Quality management and assistance for practitioners
 - (xiv) Independent outside practitioners – confidentiality
 - (xv) The institution supports the outside-practitioners
 - (xvi) Funding NGOs – trust between state and non-governmental sector
 - (xvii) Awareness in main-stream society is key
 - (xviii) Media and party-political discourses
 - (xix) Family – and representatives of civil society
 - (xx) Trans-institutional support relationships – post-release coaching
 - (xxi) Long-term interventions are needed
 - (xxii) What doesn’t work -- anti-aggression and cognitive- behavioural training

**The organisations which delivered
the Challenge Hate Crime project were:**

Northern Ireland Prison Service

www.dojni.gov.uk/index/ni-prison-service.htm

NIACRO

www.niacro.co.uk



Carecall

www.carecallwellbeing.com

Corish Film Productions

www.corish.tv

Institute of Conflict Research

www.conflictresearch.org.uk

Mediation NI

www.mediationnorthernireland.org

Violence Prevention Network

www.violence-prevention-network.de



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